Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1064315
artillery forces have not addressed the issue for a decade. Fourthly – Po- land is also where solutions for marking and indicating targets for other launchers/artilleries have been developed thanks to creative advance- ments made in the area of telemetry. A couple of software upgrades were also born in Poland. It's a kind of a paradox that many of the solutions implemented with the latest generation Spikes have their roots in Polish developments. It is currently clear that the number of launchers is insufficient for Polish requirements, hence the search for additional weapons. At the same time, the dissatisfaction with the quality of the product and customer service offered by the Polish manufacturer of Spike systems is at its peak. This, coupled with MOD's favor towards American solutions, has coincided with Raytheon's intensive marketing campaign run in Poland, promoting its solution as the perfect option for POLSOF, TDF, and air-assault forc- es. Assuming, of course, an "off the shelf" option via FMS ~2,000-3,000 missiles, which would grant a low defect level. Another argument is that the FGM-148 is a solution of a different class than the Spike, and that it is exactly what our army requires and needs. Is it? Marketing the Javelin as a solution for TDF is a misunderstanding – this formation should avoid direct combat with tanks by any means, and this can be possible only if it adopts a fiber-optical ATGM solution offering the BLOS mode. The matter of a shorter training does not make the offered solution more advantageous if we compare training programs composed of the same elements. Special Forces are quite specific in this context; here, we should take into account the freedom of purchase of such a solution. The lower weight of the FMG-148 is an advantage, true. But then again – the Spike lets the user choose the point of impact and offers a range of over 4 km, includ- ing without the target in sight. Both systems are suitable for being landed with the soldiers using them. The end-users from air-assault forces, after becoming familiar with both systems, are much in favor of the current solution, stressing the Spike's much larger actual range, its incompara- bly greater functional flexibility, the option to redirect the missile onto a target given a higher priority after the missile is launched, the safety of operation, the low risk of friendly-fire, or the declared more convenient and quicker use of the CLU as well as the reportedly better sensors fea- tured in it. Does it mean that the Javelin performs poorly compared to the Spike? Absolutely not – it's an amazing system with great potential, but its cur- rent promotion in Poland is somewhat forced because it is marketed in areas where it simply can't rival the solution already in use in Poland. To understand why this is so, it is necessary to go back to the history of the AAWS-M program and the origins of the FGM-148. Americans needed a light system for the platoon-company level. One that would let them fire quickly at multiple targets at a distance of about 1 km. It was to "thick- en" the fire and – at the same time – combat targets in view effectively and quickly. Hence the low minimum range, small size, low weight of the whole set, and the F&F mode as the only option available. It becomes clear when we look at the potential of American anti-tank units: ABCT (apart from tanks) have 87 Javelins and as many as 122 TOW-2As and 2Bs on their vehicles in twin launchers. This gives a total of 209 launch- ers. The lighter, wheeled SBTCs have 117 Javelins and 9 self-propelled TOW M1134s, not counting the 27 Stryker MGSs with 105 mm guns. To www.fragoutmag.com