Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1150145
OBRZEŻA MIASTA WSZYSTKO GOTOWE... In Poland, where terrorist threats are less common than in Western countries, the threat that is most likely to occur is an attack of "lone wolf", probably inspired by similar cases from abroad and by the propaganda and instructions they may find on the Internet. A scenario where an embassy or a government building is taken control of by terrorists is much less probable than an attack launched by one person or a small group, whose mo- tives, modus operandi, and targets may be difficult to predict. They may aim at a shopping mall or a nightclub, maybe some other facility, not necessarily in the cap- ital city. The perpetrator – or perpetra- tors – may mix ideological with personal motives, which additionally increases the number of possible scenarios. It may be therefore necessary to act quickly, adequately to local circumstanc- es, using available means. Leaving aside the already mentioned issue concern- ing the legal interpretation of any such event, especially under the pressure of time and with limited information, the problem is the decision-making chain – its length, to be more precise. Sticking to the example of a shooting in a shopping mall, police patrols will be the first to arrive at the scene, followed by additional forces and resources of the police and rescue services, with count- er-terrorist subunit police officers reach- ing the site sooner or later. The terrorist won't wait until all units are ready to act, until there's a person in charge ap- pointed, and until an operations team is assembled. A quite obvious question appears: is it re- ally necessary to have an officer appoint- ed by the Police Chief or the relevant Provincial Police Commander to order and manage evacuation and vehicle and pedestrian traffic stops in a given loca- tion? Couldn't such powers be vested by default in a lower-rank officer, who could exercise them sooner? To compare – the British have adopt- ed a different command system. It is based on three levels – bronze, silver, and gold, which has been transplant- ed into the Polish setting as different levels of managing rescue operations: intervention, tactical, and strategic, with a similar division provided for also in the internal police regulations. But the solution is nowhere to be found in the anti-terrorism law. It's not about a total transformation of the command system because the general trend should be con- sidered reasonable, but about featuring elements enabling effective reaction in urgent situations. Another paradox is the lengthy procedure of making decisions regarding the engage- ment of military units. The problem is that in other situations, for example, when it's necessary to neutralize unex- ploded bombs or to undertake a rescue mission, decisions are not made at the ministry level. Under the current legis- lation, a decision to send a small subunit to support the police is subject to similar decision-making procedure as a decision to send entire battalions to the streets if there's a state of emergency. Since the law provides for separate prin- ciples of using firearms by special forc- es, which means that the specificity of operations of this type of armed forces has been taken into account, it would be logical to acknowledge that in the case of decisions to engage subunits of special forces it may be reasonable to allow for a different, faster decision-making system. www.fragoutmag.com