Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1173894
land. This "umbrella" consists of surface- to-air systems, such as S-300 (SA-10 Grumble), S-400 (SA-21 Growler), sur- face-to-water systems like Bastion (SS- C-5 Stooge) or Bal (SSC-6 Sennight) and, finally, ground-to-ground missiles (especially Iskanders). Theoretically, such systems might combat targets at great distances, for example: S-400 has a range of up to 400 km while P-800 On- iks missiles of the Bastion system – up to 350 km. It is important due to two reasons. First, naval communication routes are the only alternative for land roads through Poland, while using them would become impossible, if Russia managed to block sea traffic within that basin. Heavy units and their supplies might reach Lith- uania or Latvia by sea. Second, the A2/AD blockade of the air space is assumed to exclude or disrupt the use of the western qualitative advan- tage of air units – so that both fighters and support aircrafts (AWACS, tankers, EW) and, of course, transporters would have to keep their distance while Russia would freely use its air units. At that moment, the chance of providing help for the attacked Baltic republics would decrease drastically, especially due to the fact that the theoretical range of systems – both land and sea – cover the territories of those republics as well as a significant part of Poland. The very pres- ence of those systems might already be a deterrent factor and if they had to be used – Russia could count on an advanta- geous result after using a small number of expensive missiles. It highlights the role of precision muni- tion in the modern battlefield. However, as it has been already mentioned, in or- der to use them, it is necessary to have a complete reconnaissance and offensive system composed of both effectors (i.e. missiles and their carriers) and sensors that would allow target detection. What is important, A2/AD systems can be used along with other types of weaponry. For instance, in a situation with Russians using naval mines, anti-ship systems can hinder the attempts of anti-mine units trying to eliminate the threat. It is clear then that Western countries, as their first challenge, must protect themselves against Russian missiles and neutralize the A2/AD systems in order to create an area for operations. In spite of the general opinion, range alone is not that important. The report titled "Bursting the Bubble" dated Febru- ary 2019 presented interesting facts. It debunked a number of myths concerning those systems and apart from providing substantive content, it is also a good ex- ample of how to counter Russian propa- ganda. First of all, in order to have a rocket reach its target, the target must be de- tected. It is a relatively easy task in case of large stationary structures – airbases or power plants will not change their lo- cation. Ships and planes are a different story. They must be detected, classified (i.e. identified), and tracked; missiles can be launched only after a decision is made to destroy them. In the case of air tar- gets, the maximum range of radars (and missiles themselves) can be reached only under certain conditions – just like fuel consumption in a car. A car will consume less fuel, if it is used in the most favorable conditions. The same applies to radars. The maximum range can be achieved for targets at great heights and of large ra- dar cross section. The lower the object is located and the smaller its radiolocation signature is, the more limited the actu- al range of detection will be. The use of AWACS is only a partial for that problem, since they are unable to guide missiles to targets. The capabilities of anti-aircraft systems are even more limited in the case of aircrafts or missiles with reduced radar cross-section – such as F-35. Such was the background for the recent con- flict between the USA and Turkey when Turkey had to make a choice – either F-35s or Russian anti-air systems. That is why Russian instructors and advisors were unable to perform measurements of radiolocation signatures of the most advanced NATO fighters. Additional vari- ables, in this case, also include terrain obstacles and the use of active inter- ference. Thus, it is possible not only to delay or even avoid detection, but also to efficiently destroy anti-aircraft systems, either from air, land or sea. In this context, it is very peculiar that the USA, for several years, has been developing a whole set of measures to counteract long-range anti-air defense: new versions of AGM-88, including the already implemented AGM-88E AARGM with a range of 110 km, as well as its variation with twice as long range which is still in the works. This would also include measures such as ADM-160 MALD – launched from aircrafts, unmanned decoy missiles sim- ulating a number of types of aircrafts and some of them are equipped with interfer- ence devices (MALD-J). They are used to provoke activation of the anti-aircraft de- fense (which allows distinguishing decoys from actual artillery positions). It is also possible to saturate the airspace with a high number of targets, which will over- burden the anti-aircraft systems that, all in all, have their limitations (e.g. concern- ing the missile targeting). For example, the radar S-300, according to available data, is capable to track up to 12 targets at the same time, while S-400 – up to 36. Combining the above with the fact that a launcher holds a limited number of missiles, it is possible to create a gap to be used by actual missiles. It is also pos- sible to utilize other measures, such as rocket artillery or other types of missiles – if the range allows it. Of course, such an operation requires great effort and careful planning, yet it is feasible. The problem of anti-ship systems is eas- ier to solve. Due the shape of the globe, the range of surface radar is approx. 40 km and requires additional sensors (air- craft or helicopters) for extended range. Same rules apply to anti-ship missiles carried by aircraft. The Bastion might be countered by destroying reconnaissance assets with fighters or vessels with AA systems. Multi-layered air defense will decrease threat of anti-vessel missile. The high-altitude ballistic profile of Onix missile makes it vulnerable. As with SAM systems, the Bastion launcher itself is a weak point. The battery consists of up to four launcher-vehicles with two missiles each. This means it can fire up to 8 mis- siles before changing the firing position to avoid counterbattery fire and reload new missiles. When procedure is com- plete, Bastion can fire again. Third part are land-based systems such as Iskander or long-range rocket artil- lery mentioned above. These assets are hard to counter as they can be quickly camouflaged, does not require recce sen- sors and multiple for war, will be even time consuming ducted limited. All that combat fire just the missiles. systems It seems is going tems. Nuclear will be again. surprise, connaissance very important. The time in mind technical future period. measures the meaning become hand, reserves generated. Performance another tlefield air space, include activities, activity one of the scope as 4x30 squadrons battleships, shorter Is it enough tation of Russian which past, when the conflict. mention 100 Su-34 a similar www.fragoutmag.com