Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1173894
on purchasing F-35s can be interpreted as "to extinguish the fire" caused by the said problems with Fulcrums. We should then try to imagine the target structure of means of destruction that would not only allow restoring the bal- ance of power within the Baltic region, but even making it more favorable for Po- land. This finds reflection in requirements for modernization. Bearing in mind, in particular, the meaning of anti-aircraft and anti-rocket defense, modernization seems to be a priority. We do not only mean here both phases of the Wisła pro- gram or the partial implementation of new short-range systems. In light of challeng- es connected with the role of the Baltic Sea, also during a conventional conflict, it seems justified – despite all the problems and obstacles – to obtain rocket frig- ates capable of ensuring zone defense. Those ships can perform a set of tasks during peace and crisis, but also during war, especially by protecting groups of ships, convoys, or by reinforcing (or rather ensuring) anti-aircraft defense of the coast. The very role and capabilities of those ships could be the subject of a separate article. Here, it is worthwhile noting that protection provided by such ships would allow increasing the chanc- es of a successful task performed by the Naval Missile Unit (MJR). In the case of the MJR, it could be interesting to in- crease its capabilities through further modernizations of NSMs by introducing a two-way data exchange link and the possibility of performing flights over land. Air forces also require modernization, or rather expansion. It is obvious that 48 F-16s is a rather small power. We do not know how many F-35s will be purchased, but people speak of 32 aircrafts. We also do not know the details on their speci- fication. However, we can assume that, bearing in mind the possibilities, they will be used as sensors rather than as ef- fectors and they will fight only the most difficult targets. So, a logical conclusion is to expect at least modernization of F-16s, especially bearing in mind the need for systems to exchange tactical data between both types of fighters. Poland could have a maximum of 32 5th gener- ation fighters (F-35) and 48 older gen- eration F-16s (Gen 4+). It gives a total of 80 aircrafts. Taking into consideration the number of tasks that will need deal- ing with – from reconnaissance, fighting air targets, close air support, isolation of the battlefield and attacks deep behind the enemy lines – the number seems low. One has to remember here that some of the F-16s will be assigned with reconnaissance missions due to DB-110 pods. Since Poland has decided to buy long-range cruise missiles (JASSM and JASSM-ER), it seems obvious that in case of war another part of the forces will have to be preserved for an eventual usage of that weapon. The question is whether it is necessary to acquire more 4th generation aircrafts (like, for example, new F-16s) in order to assign them with all the other tasks or maybe such capabilities will be trans- ferred to other elements. A frequent logic flaw is to equate the task with the platform – meanwhile, for example, close fire support can be performed by planes, but also by choppers or (gun and rocket) land-based systems of artillery. Such an option is favored by mathematical cal- culations. If we assume that the enemy must outnumber us three times, while additional power multipliers (parameters of sensors, armaments, stealth proper- ties in the case of F-35s) increase the disproportion – to 4:1 or even 5:1 – in order to overcome a force of 80 fight- ers, the aggressor must use over 300 aircrafts. Now, we should move back to the qualitative and quantitative data concerning Russian aviation – and, due to various reasons, we should not expect the use of full potential. Another problem that Poland must deal with is connected with reconnaissance capabilities. Land and vessel-based ra- dars are only one part of the puzzle. Po- land still does not have AWACS aircrafts, despite the fact that such aircrafts as well as patrol and EW aircrafts might be of key importance in determination of situational awareness, especially during critical periods. On the other hand, development of forc- es for cyberspace operations is a clear sign of progress – although such forces will not replace means of data acquisi- tion, they will only complement them. So, paradoxically, technological progress has opened an interesting path for the development of armed forces in favor of ANALYSIS