Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1281650
Having a look at the cost that had to be covered by other nations procuring the F-35, the effort mentioned above will probably entail spending of PLN 1.5 - 2 bn. SUMMARY The Harpia program demonstrates most of the problems that are valid for the process of modernization pursued by the Polish Armed Forces as a whole. Insufficient funding, lack of a coherent and adequate vision of potential development, and lack of consistency in the implementation of that vision in line with the adopted timeline - this sentence can be used to describe most of the modernization programs in the Polish military. Focusing on the F-35 procurement, the factors located outside the technology domain should be focused on, including the unclear procurement process seriously lacking in transparency. The Harpia program, at the stage of the analytical-conceptual phase, was a competitive procurement procedure involving five foreign entities. Then, based on a confidential decision made by the head of the MoD, it was taken out of the standard procurement decision making framework. Instead, a confidential process was adopted, without any answers when it comes to the selection criteria, cost estimates associated with competitive platforms, or the total cost that Poland would need to cover acquiring the jets, creating the infrastructure, acquiring the armament and maintaining the new platform throughout its life-cycle that is going to extend beyond 3 decades. The lack of industrial compensation with regards to the procurement of a weapons system costing around 20 bn. PLNis also a matter that shall be assessed negatively. Contrary to the statements made by the MoD, Poland had no chance to join the program in the role of a partner. The process through which the participant nations were being gathered, to share the program cost and gain the benefits out of it, has come to a definite closure in 2003. As the Finnish or Danish examples have shown, even at the present stage of the JSF program, some real benefits for the domestic industry could be gained alongside the procurement. Warsaw resigned from tender procurement, and this step has made the path towards any benefits that could come with the jet more difficult to access, if at all accessible. The above also means that Poland would gain no know-how allowing the industrial entities to autonomously carry out maintenance of the jets. Here, Poland would need to use the services rendered by the JSF program partners. Paradoxically, the greatest drawback of the confidential procurement process is also the greatest advantage of this acquisition: the short time that elapsed from the actual decision to the agreement conclusion. However, undoubtedly, the necessity to acquire the new assets rapidly, to fill in the gap stemming from years of backlog, should not serve as justification for this specific form of acquisition. If one wants to learn the difference between the Polish MRCA procurement program and similar programs, one should have a closer look at the Finnish HX program. It is a good example, both due to the geopolitical similarity, as well as due to the quantity of the jets that Helsinki intends to procure. Finland, looking for 64 new airframes to replace 62 F/A-18C/D Hornets, decided to carry out a competitive procurement procedure. The tender, at its final stage, involves 5 bidders out of four countries. The Finnish MoD assumes that such an approach would make it possible for Helsinki to negotiate a much better deal coupled with a satisfactory level of industrial cooperation, involving the domestic entities and the potential winning bidder. Another important aspect is the fact that not only does Finland expert the bidders to outline the aircraft and infrastructure procurement cost, as Helsinki also demands the manufacturers to estimate the costs associated with the operational use of the fighters throughout their life cycles, expected to last for 3 decades. Even though no 1:1 transfer can be done, when it comes to the Finnish example, a comparison as such shows how different Poland is, and how far away it departs from the Western armament procurement standards. Summing the Harpia program up, one cannot disregard the further plans pertaining to the Polish military aviation, disclosed somewhat on this occasion. The Polish Ministry of Defence also announced that the new Technical Modernization Plan adopted for the term between 2021 and 2035 assumes that another F-16 squadron would be procured. Poland is also willing to join the American "loyal wingman" program that is to result in the development and introduction of a UAV capable of, working directly with manned MRCA, to execute tasks typical of the latter, including air combat and air-to-surface engagements. Acquisition of the "loyal wingmen" within the framework of the "Harpi szpon" [Harpy Claw] program would have the purpose of offloading the F-16 fleet in case of the most convoluted and risky missions, also acting in a role of an F-35 supplement. However, this is just a plan and a declaration that has no actual price tag. The pragmatism, fused with the current, almost fatal condition of the Polish military and the long queue of "priority programs" awaiting funding and contained in the Technical Modernization Plan, altogether forces the opinion-makers to express not "realistic", but doubtful assessments. The doubts also have their roots in the saga of plans and promises that we could have witnessed in the case of the Harpia program itself. These assumptions may be changed by another disaster attracting media attention. The unfortunate events as such always force the authorities to take actions to save the day, with causes emerging directly on the grounds of many years of backlog. But these are not the stimuli that we are expecting. www.fragoutmag.com