Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1308154
vehicle, once the total adjustment button was pressed and the target was kept in the sight picture for 2-4 seconds, and then, another 2 sec- onds were needed to measure the distance to the target with the use of the laser rangefinder. As a result of the above, the ballistic com- puter calculates the adjustment and then implements it which shifts the crosshair that moves to accommodate the adjustment data. The crosshair needs to be placed over the target again, which takes some time. Only then the gun can be fired. The whole procedure takes up to 8 seconds. Unfortunately, for reasons of technical nature, the gunner's sight was stabilized in a manner dependent on the gun and the turret. The accuracy, when on the move, was inferior to Leopard 2 and M1. The main sight features an optical channel offering a 1x to 8x magnifi- cation. The night channel has 7x magnification but it only uses a gen-I night vision system. This meant that the effective range was limited to 800 meters at best. In rough conditions, this distance was halved. Mk I initially featured a strong Xenon spotlight, but that solution was later abandoned. The commander has six periscopes at his disposal, along with a simple daytime periscope offering a 4x-20x magnification - with- out a stabilizer unit and with poor optical properties. The commander could also view the gunner's sight picture and he was able to take over control over the armament. The 105 mm M68 gun, broadly proliferated in the US MBTs of the peri- od, was the primary source of the Merkava's firepower. The L51 thread- ed barrel could accommodate pressures of up to 430 MPa. It had a lifetime of 400 shots for the anti-tank sabot rounds. The stabilization system came from the US M60A1 AOS. It was not the best solution in the world. It was slightly better than the T-62's 2E15 Meteor, but it offered 1 mil accuracy, as per the MIL-HDBK-799 manual. Tests of the M60A1 AOS in Sweden, with 400 shots at a distance ranging from 500 meters to 2 kilometers, against stationary and moving targets, have shown that hit probability is at the level of 72%, with 11 to 14 seconds needed to take the shot. This is relevant here - Merkava Mk 1 used the very same stabilizer and gun, but these were coupled with an indig- enous fire control system - not necessarily better than the US-made solutions. Ammunition the Israeli had for Merkava Mark 1 has been a major advantage though. The Israeli industry has developed a broad range of 105 mm M68 and L7 gun counterpart rounds. M152 HEAT rounds could penetrate up to 430 mm of steel. M156 HESH and M158 smoke/incendiary (white phosphorus) rounds were available in the cat- alog as well. M111 Hetz armor-piercing discarding sabot rounds were the pearl in the crown - this ammunition was introduced into service in 1978. The Israeli "arrow" was a modern round, with a 271 mm tungsten penetrator preceded with three tungsten cylinders with decreasing di- ameter and length (20, 18, and 19 mm respectively). They played a vital role in the penetration process. According to the Soviet intel, the M111 Hetz was able to penetrate up to 340 mm of armor plate inclined at 60 degrees angle. The values were insignificantly higher for the shorter distance. Not only could Hetz, as it turned out in the USSR, during test firings, penetrate the T-64A and T-72 Ural hulls. It could also go through the reinforced T-72 hull, as well as through the hulls of the T-80 and the early T-80Bs. The Israeli MBT carried 62 rounds. However, it could accommodate up to 85 rounds in total. FN MAG 7.62 mm machine gun, coupled with the main gun, served as the secondary armament. The commander and the gunner also had machine guns of their own. In total, 10,000 7.62 mm rounds were available onboard. The Merkavas also had a 60 mm Soltam mortar on board, on the right-hand side of the turret. The crew had 30 smoke, HE, and illumination mortar bombs at their disposal. Assessment of the Merkava's firepower can be disappointing for avid fans of the design. It was not comparable to the Leopard 2A0 and the first M1. The stabilizer was much more prone to errors, the command- er's situational awareness was limited, the night vision system was inferior (even when one takes into account the fact that Leopard 2 had no thermal imaging system available until 1983). There is no chance that Merkava Mk 1 could win this battle by any stretch. The Israeli de- sign was also inferior when compared to the T-80B (1978). It featured the 1A33 FCS with the 1G42 sight. The Soviet FCS featured the 1V517 ballistic computer, 1B11 wind sensor, 1B14 temperature sensor, laser rangefinder, and other sensors. The system was also capable of ad- justing the sight in relation to the gun movement, not to the crosshair. The gunner was hence not required to reacquire the target after adjust- ing. This was a luxury that the Merkava's gunner could not even think about. The Soviet 2E38M2 stabilizer system was also a bit better than its US-made predecessor implemented in M60A1 AOS. Paradoxically, the T-80B commander also had much better situational awareness, with the TKN-3M scope available - obsolete at the time, but still better than the Merkava's instrument with the weak optical specification. The T-80B crew had a passive night vision system at their disposal, with a range of 400-800 meters. Thanks to a thumb-button, the commander could easily align the gun with the TKN-3M periscope. The majority of the remarks above remain quite relevant in the case of the T-64B as well. The best Soviet MBTs also had a quite good fire control sys- tem that was only inferior to the equivalent solutions in Leopard 2 and Abrams. The first generation of the Israeli Chariot was not on that list. Merkava Mk 1 featured a FCS better than T-72 Ural and T-72M1(A). But these platforms had no fire control system at all. The 2E28M stabiliz- er could be viewed as a comparable solution. One could not say that about the sights though. TPD-2-49 system used in the T-72 Ural was primitive, to say the least. The refreshed TPD-K1 system was better. But still, the T-72 MBT had no fire control system per se. Merkava also had much better assets than the simple sights in the T-62s. The Israeli MBT had a major advantage over the tanks operated by Syria and Isra- el - thanks to the fire control system. This element was missing in the case of the Egyptian and Syrian T-62s. The same could be said about the latest Syrian T-72 Ural MBTs. Merkavas also had guns that were far more accurate (fire control system, stabilizer, and dispersion - all these parameters were much better for the Israeli MBT). The M111 ammunition was another strong asset that Merkava had at its dispos- al. At a distance of 2 kilometers, it made it possible to freely neutralize T-62s and T-55s. The T-72 hull could have been easily penetrated by those projectiles, at a similar range. Merkava Mark 1 crews could feel confident when fighting against the MBTs operated by the neighboring nations. MERKAVA MK.1 IN COMBAT P300 Merkava Mark 1 MBTs were manufactured until 1983. The tanks went through their baptism of fire in 1982, in southern Lebanon. Less than 200 Merkavas were used in combat. The fighting was heavy and confusing for the crews. On one hand, the IDF was artificially limited, when it comes to the scope and involvement in the operations, on the other hand though, the Syrians were highly determined. They also em- ployed "tank hunter-killer" squads, well trained, using not only a broad VEHICLES