Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1333129
1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 A U T O M A T I C T A R G E T T R A C K I N G being dependent within the domain of mili- tary matters, and politics as well. Azerbai- jan, similarly to Georgia, has adopted a much more independent course, leaning towards the West. In the case of Azerbaijan we could have also witnessed leaning towards Israel, and Turkey - from where the Azeri military was sourcing its armament, UAVs included. At the same time, it needs to be noted that the internal situation, and defense policy, in both Armenia, as well as in Azerbaijan, were altogether dominated by the still-burning conflict. This has been especially pronounced in Azerbaijan - the loss has never been forgotten there. During the last decade, battles on the demarcation line have been more, and more common. A short, 4-days war also broke out in 2016 - without any conclusive results though. Aggression also occurred in the summer of last year. The war that we are discussing here broke out on September 27th, 2020. It started with Stepanakert being fired upon by the Azeri rocket artillery. The land offensive has been the next stage. It was being supported by UAVs and artillery. Initially, the Armenian side was able to hamper and stop Azerbai- jan's effort. Both sides had a significant mil- itary potential available, relative to the size of the countries. Nonetheless, Azerbaijan has been advantageous. The Polish Centre for Eastern Studies had published a study suggesting that before the conflict the Aze- ri Army had 440 MBTs and 850 IFVs at its disposal. Meanwhile, the Armenian military had 220 MBTs, and 200 IFVs and APCs in its inventory. The tube artillery assets, rocket artillery, and air defense systems were also present - on both sides. Furthermore, both sides also had mobile ballistic missile launch- ers at hand (Tochka and Lora - Azerbaijan; Tochka, Elbrus, Iskander - Armenia). When it comes to the air assets, the Azeri side has been viewed as the one having the advantage, owning 16 MiG-29 jets, 20 Su- 25 platforms, and 100 helicopters - Mi-24 and Mi-8 primarily. The Armenian Air Force had just 12 Su-25 jets at its disposal. Pro- curement of a small quantity of Su-30 air- craft was initiated in 2019. The helicopter fleet owned by Armenia consisted of several dozens of Mi-24 Hinds, and Mi-8 Hips. Both nations also operate numerous UAVs. These are discussed in detail further down below. The Armenian side had one more, significant advantage - the terrain. The mountainous area with a scarcity of roads limited the options available when it came to the use of MBTs, and mechanized assets. This has been hampering the operational tempo and also influenced the war as a whole. At the same time, one could note that the Azeri effort was focused on the southern section of the front. This is where they managed to take over the most significant area. They penetrated the Armenian-controlled territory to the depth of 50 kilometers, recovering access to territory bordering Iran that Azerbaijan had lost more than 25 years ago. Approach- ing Susha and Lachin they have been able to block the roads between Armenia and Step- anakert, also taking over a major portion of the road towards the Nakhchivan republic in the South. Three ceasefire agreements, negotiated by Russia (two), and the US (one), have become a thing of the past quite quickly. It has become clear that none of the parties involved would benefit from keeping in line with the ceasefire conditions, as this would lead to the status quo being maintained. The fourth ceasefire agreement announced between November 9th and 10th has been the one that turned out to be effective. It was concluded via Moscow and it was sanc- tioning the Azeri military success. Based on that ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan recov- ered all of the territories that had been tak- en over by Armenia in the past, surrounding Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan has also been granted the right to use the land-based corridor going through the Armenian terri- tory and connecting it to the Nakhichevan republic. A similar corridor is expected to be established between Armenia, and Nagorno Karabakh. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is yet to be defined in further negotiation, which would also define the level of its au- tonomy. Russian forces have been deployed in the re- gion, acting in the peacekeeping role - with a single mechanized brigade and border patrol units. The Russian peacekeeping mission is to last for 5 years. The period could be ex- tended, though. Furthermore, the Russians would be controlling the aforesaid corri- dors. The peacekeeping component is not an international one. There is no presence of the Turkish element in the agreement, even though the Turkish F-16s are rumored to be stationed in Azerbaijan. Probably, their task was to inflict some pressure, to influence the decision-making process in Moscow. The memorandum signed in November was concluded with the Armenian side being the losing one already. This is supported by the www.fragoutmag.com