Frag Out! Magazine
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The mass use of loitering munitions is fair- ly interesting (UAVs fitted with warheads, being capable of spending up to a couple of hours over the battlefield, searching for valuable targets, in a mixed strike-recon- naissance role). Furthermore, contrary to conventional cruise missiles, the loitering munitions are recoverable, should they be unable to detect the targets. Therefore, systems as such can be used in a dual rec- ce-strike role. This set of capabilities comes close to what is offered by MRCA. Given the modest quantity of air assets that Azer- baijan had at its disposal, the UAVs have become a substitute for manned aviation assets, also being cheaper, and making it possible to avoid loss of life. Although Armenians have been using a va- riety of air defense assets (including the S-300P and self-propelled Tor and Osa-AK/ AKM), they were still unable to defend them- selves from the airstrikes. The air defense system has been penetrable. For instance, the Tor systems have not been deployed to the frontline most probably. Plausibly, the systems were not combat-ready, or the Ar- menians wanted to save them, should the conflict reach the territory of the state. The elements of the S-300 SAM - launchers and radars - were subjected to several UAV/ ballistic missile strikes. Osa SAMs were be- ing eliminated at stand-off distance by UAVs carrying guided bombs and by loitering mu- nitions. These strikes, most probably, were also supported by SIGINT and electronic warfare assets. The Azeri side, therefore, could have been viewed as the one that had gained air superiority in the area. The quan- tity, quality, and variety of measures that were used to neutralize the air defenses, as well as the fact that no IAMD system was present on the Armenian side both facil- itated the process of neutralization of the Armenian air defenses. The individual assets did not provide mutual support among them- selves. This left the destruction of the Osa- AK/AKM SAMs being virtually unpunished. Gaining air superiority here allowed Azer- baijan to act against the Armenian artillery and ballistic missile launchers. UAVs were also employed to engage MBTs, but in a manner that could be viewed as unconven- tional. Both the large Bayrakrar, as well as the smaller Israeli drones are not carrying typical anti-tank warheads. Intermediary methods were used, aimed at inflicting un- repairable damage - for instance, the drones were attacking the engine compartments of the MBTs. The damaged vehicles were immobilized. Even though potential recovery operations have been possible, the vehicles were being often abandoned by the crews thus being eliminated from the battle. Then these MBTs were being attacked again, or they were being taken over by the Azeri forces. UAVs were also used to attack in- fantry - either directly, or by directing the artillery fire. In the case of infantry, or light vehicles - the Armenian side suffered from significant losses. The domination of the unmanned platforms and the losses impacting the armored assets created some doubts among the experts, who were questioning the future of the MBT on the future battlefield. Undoubtedly, having a look at the recordings depicting the Armenian T-72 MBTs being attacked from above, one could conclude that the MBT era has come to an end. This is a methodological fallacy since solely recordings of successful strikes have been shared. The broader con- text is not being taken into account, should this mindset be adopted. Above all, it needs to be accounted for, that MBTs, thanks to their armor and active means of protection that are becoming more, and more common, are becoming increasingly more resilient to attacks as such. Secondly, the UAV tactics were effective, due to the lack of lethal abil- ities on the part of the Armenian air defense assets.The above means that as a variety of UAS is becoming more, and more common, the land forces and the infrastructure need to be protected by an integrated, multi-lay- ered air defense system. The above would greatly weaken the target acquisition ca- pacity of the reconnaissance platforms, and limit the engagement options for the UAVs acting against the land platforms. IAMD would also be effective in working against assets tasked with neutralizing the air de- fense system itself. The Armenian Osa SAM systems would not have been so effectively neutralized by the UAVs at the stand-off dis- tance, should a higher level of the IAMD be employed, at a higher altitude and greater range. The fact is, that some of the countries - Russia for instance - do own multi-layered air defense systems as such. Other nations, such as the US, are on their way to create such solutions, or - to be fair - to recover the capabilities following years of cuts in this domain. The above means that overcoming an expansive air defense system would re- quire more assets. This pertains both to re- connaissance and monitoring areas, as well as to the electronic countermeasures and the effector (loitering munitions/PGMs). It is also obvious that the mass presence of the UAVs could limit the use of other weap- ons. The above "other weapons" refers to manned air assets. UAVs are also far less expensive, thus more of them can be pro- cured. This also would mean that numerous target decoys could become common, being more complex than modified An-2s. UAVs also do not need large infrastructure re- quiring protection. The pilots whose training is expensive are not needed. They can be re- placed by operators working on the ground. From Poland's point of view, the factors listed above, with Warsaw facing a neces- sity to take steps towards implementing numerous modernization programs, would create a necessity to consider the poten- tial paths of development for programs as such. The above refers to rotary-wing as- sets and MRCA primarily. The CAS capa- bilities provided by the aforesaid manned platforms could be potentially taken over by the unmanned systems. Furthermore, these assets can also be placed in a different place of the Armed Forces' structure. Inclusion of the organic UAV elements in the Army divi- sions and brigades could be justified, as it happens already when it comes to the artil- lery assets. This would result in the creation of the best conditions required to establish a cohesive and coherent reconnaissance and strike solution. The second pillar of that system would come in a form of tube and rocket artillery assets, ranging from ballistic missiles to self-propelled mortars. 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