Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1365706
Author: Staselnik sessing Merkava's mobility, it is clearly visible that the high weight of the MBT, and the weak engine, altogether were the cause for the mobility to be weaker than in the case of Leopard 2A5, Leclerc, or M1A2. The difference was not a significant one at all. The protection system of Mk 3 seems to be, paradoxically, its weakest point. The special armor being relatively thin, without numerous NeRA and NxRA armor, and the turret structure slimmed in relation to Mk 1 and Mk 2 variants, made it quite challenging to praise the new iteration of Merkava. It is clearly visible that the protection concept still assumed that the MBT shall be protected within the range of around +/- 20° from the longitudinal axis of the hull. When it comes to the former matter, the protection elements have been designed in a way that assumed that the in- dividual armor modules contained 2 to 3 NERA layers, and it was placed over the turret structure with 50-80 mm RHA thickness. As a result of the steps above, for angles of up to 20 degrees, the effector first needed to penetrate inclined NERA layers (2-3), and then go through 160-200 mm of RHA, de- pending on the angle. This protection made it possible to stop ATGMs such as BGM-71C ITOW (guaranteed to penetrate 630 mm of steel) or HOT 1 (able to go through 720-780 mm of RHA), or MILAN 1 (penetrating, depending on the variant, 580-711 mm of RHA). ATGMs with stronger warheads, or fitted with tandem warheads, must have been able to penetrate the Mk 3B armor. Noteworthy, we are referring to angles of +/-20°, not +/- 30° (as in the case of NATO MBTs), or +/- 35°, as in the case of the Soviet designs. The pro- tection was also weak when it comes to sabot rounds. In the case of the multi-element sabot penetrators with a tungsten sub-core (3BM15, 3BM22) they stood no chance of going through this armor. On the other hand, long- rod monoblock penetrators could stand up to the challenge. Maybe, 125 mm ammunition such as BM42 or BM32 could also be useful here - as it was designed to penetrate the NATO 1st gen. special armor. One shall note that Israel used NERA and NxRA protection when, starting from 1988, Germany and the USA began to create ceramic armor that stood a greater chance of defeating the sabot round penetrators. Most of the remarks above also apply to the hull. Comparing the Mk 3 BAZ to the Soviet MBTs (such as T-80UD [Ob. 478BE], T-80U [Ob. 219AS], or the T-90 [Ob. 188]) is also confusing, since their armor was far better than Merkava's in its latest iteration, both when it came to kinetic, as well as HE rounds. Obviously, the fire control system of Mk 3B has been superior. The mobility of Merkava, meanwhile, was comparable, to say the least. The protection levels, however, were the weakest element of the new generation of the Israeli MBT. IDF was about to lose its advantage over the neighbors, in the armor department. Even if the Syrian MBTs stood no chance facing Merkavas, Egypt has made worrying steps towards the ac- quisition of more than 1,000 M1A1 in their export variant, based on a mem- orandum signed in 1988. The assembly of the license-manufactured M1A1 began at Plant no. 200 near Cairo in 1992. Regardless of the deficiencies of the export armor, it was still better than the Israeli achievements applicable to Merkava Mk 2B and Mk 3B. To make the matters worse, Egypt also pro- cured the 120 mm tungsten penetrator KE-W rounds, with 680 mm core. This made it possible for the Egyptian MBTs to penetrate more than 600 mm of steel, at an angle of 60 degrees, and at a distance of 2 kilometers. This meant that Merkavas - both Mk 2B, as well as Mk 3B - were simply outmatched. Jor- danian procurement of ex-British Challenger 1 was equally worrying. www.fragoutmag.com