Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407425
for a product so successful? Poland needs around 1,000 unmanned turrets with an automatic gun for the wheeled and tracked platforms - this includes the reconnaissance vehicles. The Polish Ministry of Defense should have a budget allocated to cover the costs of this acquisition unless it decides to modernize the non-prospective, obsolete junk - the BMP-1. Due to the payload capacity of the above IFV, only an open-design weapons station can be used. The final result of an upgrade as such would be disputable, as the base carrier platform would be obsolete as well, requiring a complete redesign. If the Polish Ministry of Defense and the General Command do not fall for ridiculous ideas as such, nothing is standing in the way towards the acquisition of up to 1,000 unmanned ZSSW-30 turrets. And this system is very much needed, as it improves the combat capabilities available to the Rosomak APC crews. HSW-WB consortium's manufacturing capacity is not a matter of concern. The ability that the Polish Armed Forces have to absorb new equipment is more of an issue. The experience shows that the manufacturing capacity of HSW S.A. exceeds, a couple of times, the Armed Forces' capacity to introduce new equipment per annum. This has been the case for Krab howitzer and Rak self-propelled mortar system. This is where the bottleneck can be found, which may have an impact on retrofitting of the turrets onto the vehicles. ZSSW-30 simulators/training systems are needed immediately (such as the already known Rosiczka system). Unfortunately, as it usually happens in Poland - the combat system comes first, and only after it has been procured, the user begins to think about advanced simulators or training systems. The aforesaid gap is the only deficiency the ZSSW- 30 has in the Polish military. It is not the consortium's fault. Regardless of what the rumors are, the latest HSW's brainchild is passing the tests perfectly, and flawlessly. It may be expected that by mid-2021 the turret will be officially a part of the Polish Army's inventory, and the first procurement agreement would be concluded - for 200 turrets. The manufacturing, with a supply chain being established, and with the expected adjustment, should take around 3 years. So, does a product so refined, and implemented in the Polish Armed Forces, stand a chance to achieve export success? No. ZSSW-30, in the variant designed for the Polish armored and mechanized units, will not be authorized to be exported. An export variant would need to be developed. However, even the export variant, a modernized one, would have major potential, due to the performance figures that place it among the top tier solutions in its class. One should, however, bear in mind the fact that no product is self-exporting. The potential success would depend on the synergy of actions taken by the consortium manufacturing the turret, the PGZ group, and on the support provided by the Polish Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Entrepreneurship and Technology, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Exporting an advanced and costly weapons system is determined, primarily, by the politics, and by the economy - all embedded within the international relations. The advantages of the given armament are of secondary relevance - unfortunately. However, should a beneficial economic and political context be established for the potential buyers, the ZSSW-30 is doomed to succeed. It is just a matter of time. ANALYSIS