Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407740
A U T O M A T I C TA R G E T T R A C K I N G 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 disposal. Procurement of a small quantity of Su-30 aircraft was initiated in 2019. The helicopter fleet owned by Armenia consisted of several dozens of Mi-24 Hinds, and Mi-8 Hips. Both nations also op- erate numerous UAVs. These are discussed in detail further down below. The Armenian side had one more, significant advan- tage - the terrain. The mountainous area with a scarcity of roads limited the options available when it came to the use of MBTs, and mechanized assets. This has been hampering the operational tempo and also influenced the war as a whole. At the same time, one could note that the Azeri effort was fo- cused on the southern section of the front. This is where they managed to take over the most significant area. They penetrated the Arme- nian-controlled territory to the depth of 50 kilo- meters, recovering access to territory bordering Iran that Azerbaijan had lost more than 25 years ago. Approaching Susha and Lachin they have been able to block the roads between Armenia and Step- anakert, also taking over a major portion of the road towards the Nakhchivan republic in the South. Three ceasefire agreements, negotiated by Russia (two), and the US (one), have become a thing of the past quite quickly. It has become clear that none of the parties involved would benefit from keeping in line with the ceasefire conditions, as this would lead to the status quo being maintained. The fourth ceasefire agreement announced be- tween November 9th and 10th has been the one that turned out to be effective. It was concluded via Moscow and it was sanctioning the Azeri mili- tary success. Based on that ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan recovered all of the territories that had been taken over by Armenia in the past, surrounding Nagorno Karabakh. Azerbaijan has also been grant- ed the right to use the land-based corridor going through the Armenian territory and connecting it to the Nakhichevan republic. A similar corridor is ex- pected to be established between Armenia, and Na- gorno Karabakh. The status of Nagorno-Karabakh is yet to be defined in further negotiation, which would also define the level of its autonomy. Russian forces have been deployed in the region, acting in the peacekeeping role - with a single mech- anized brigade and border patrol units. The Russian peacekeeping mission is to last for 5 years. The pe- riod could be extended, though. Furthermore, the Russians would be controlling the aforesaid corri- dors. The peacekeeping component is not an inter- national one. There is no presence of the Turkish element in the agreement, even though the Turkish F-16s are rumored to be stationed in Azerbaijan. Probably, their task was to inflict some pressure, to influence the decision-making process in Moscow. The memorandum signed in November was con- cluded with the Armenian side being the losing one already. This is supported by the data on the losses: 170 MBTs were lost, with some of them being taken over by Azerbaijan. Other assets were also irrecov- erably damaged. Should the war continue, for a few more days, the Azeri side could potentially succeed in cutting off the Nagorno-Karabakh exclave from Armenia. Azer- baijan could then, potentially, attempt to take over the area. Possibly, they could also take over con- trol over the corridor that leads to the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. However, these possibilities need to be considered in the political dimension, not the military one. The diplomatic importance of the steps taken has also been supported by the tangible force element - the mechanized brigade, the deployment of which was prepared beforehand. This is an act of Russian intervention, with Moscow saving its ally facing a crisis. The Russians did that to protect their inter- est as well. Hypothetically speaking, should the offensive ac- tions continue, Russia could potentially get involved in the war on the Armenian side. This, consequently, could worsen the Russia-Turkey relationship, with Turkey supporting Azerbaijan. A scenario as such would be a worse case - both for Turkey, as well as for Russia. Ankara could get its military assets involved in the conflict. Furthermore, it could also block the strategic Black Sea straits, limiting the Russian Navy's freedom of maneuver in the area, not to mention the potential dissolution of the mili- tary procurement contracts signed between Anka- ra and Moscow. The vision of a new Russian-Turkish war would not be a probable scenario here though. This would mean that Turkey, with its relationship with the West being already complicated, would open a new field of conflict, without any allies to provide support. The fact that the war ended up in another agreement suspending the conflict - as the main cause, namely the dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh, has not been resolved - is also desired by both Russia and Turkey. Both the Armenians, as well as the Azeri side, would depend on the Russians, controlling the corridors. The Armenian dependence on Russia is becoming greater, with Moscow acting as an entity capable of providing security in the region, stopping Azerbai- jan. This is even more pronounced, given the losses incurred already. Azerbaijan itself would still depend on Turkey, even though the freedom of armed action has been limited. Turkey would still be supporting the Azeri side in the military and intelligence do- mains though. When it comes to politics and strat- egy, another two important factors appeared here. The first one stems from the ineffective nature of the Armenian soft power. There were some steps made, referring to the activism undertaken by the large diaspora, to gain attention and support from the Western public sphere. For instance, System of 24 www.fragoutmag.com