Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1407740
T A R G E T 3 T A R G E T 4 M U L T I P L E T A R G E T S M O D E A L T I T U D E : 1 5 6 0 M T A R G E T L O C K : O N T A R G E T I N R A N G E : T A R G E T D I S T: T A R G E T 1 T A R G E T 2 S U S P E C T: S A U L B I N B L A D Y T A R G E T 1 T A R G E T 2 T A R G E T 2 B L A D Y B L A D Y B L A D Y B L A D Y M I S S I L E U N A R M E D 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 1 0 : 3 4 : 2 9 2 2 . 1 2 . 2 0 2 0 nian air defense assets.The above means that as a variety of UAS is becoming more, and more com- mon, the land forces and the infrastructure need to be protected by an integrated, multi-layered air de- fense system. The above would greatly weaken the target acquisition capacity of the reconnaissance platforms, and limit the engagement options for the UAVs acting against the land platforms. IAMD would also be effective in working against assets tasked with neutralizing the air defense system itself. The Armenian Osa SAM systems would not have been so effectively neutralized by the UAVs at the stand- off distance, should a higher level of the IAMD be employed, at a higher altitude and greater range. The fact is, that some of the countries - Russia for instance - do own multi-layered air defense sys- tems as such. Other nations, such as the US, are on their way to create such solutions, or - to be fair - to recover the capabilities following years of cuts in this domain. The above means that overcom- ing an expansive air defense system would require more assets. This pertains both to reconnaissance and monitoring areas, as well as to the electronic countermeasures and the effector (loitering muni- tions/PGMs). It is also obvious that the mass presence of the UAVs could limit the use of other weapons. The above "other weapons" refers to manned air as- sets. UAVs are also far less expensive, thus more of them can be procured. This also would mean that numerous target decoys could become common, being more complex than modified An-2s. UAVs also do not need large infrastructure requiring protec- tion. The pilots whose training is expensive are not needed. They can be replaced by operators working on the ground. From Poland's point of view, the factors listed above, with Warsaw facing a necessity to take steps towards implementing numerous moderniza- tion programs, would create a necessity to consider the potential paths of development for programs as such. The above refers to rotary-wing assets and MRCA primarily. The CAS capabilities provided by the aforesaid manned platforms could be potentially taken over by the unmanned systems. Furthermore, these assets can also be placed in a different place of the Armed Forces' structure. Inclusion of the organic UAV elements in the Army divisions and bri- gades could be justified, as it happens already when it comes to the artillery assets. This would result in the creation of the best conditions required to establish a cohesive and coherent reconnaissance and strike solution. The second pillar of that system would come in a form of tube and rocket artillery assets, ranging from ballistic missiles to self-pro- pelled mortars. All of the means listed here need to share a common C2 solution. Other reconnaissance platforms would complement the above - ranging from SIGINT/ELINT aerial reconnaissance assets, to recon units and special operations forces behind the enemy lines. Meanwhile, the conventional air assets could be tasked with missions that would provide better spatial awareness and freedom of maneuver, thanks to their sensors and effectors. The MRCA, such as the F-35, could potentially work in the recce/ communication relay role in the future, allowing the UAVs to act against the targets they would detect. This trend may become reality soon enough - as programs such as Loyal Wingman seem to suggest. Meanwhile, attack helicopters could potentially car- ry missiles with a range of more than 20 kilometers. Effectors as such would grant the rotary-wing plat- forms a stand-off engagement capability - at least to some extent. The attack helicopters could be po- tentially replaced by unmanned assets, or by multi- role helicopter platforms adapted to the new role. A platform-focused approach, when considering the reconnaissance/strike system, can be viewed as a mistake. The capabilities remain the key element here - and these can be provided by a myriad of vehicles or weapons systems. The second relevant component here comes in a form of the ability to utilize these means in a manner that is, realisti- cally, described as a net-centric one. Without the paradigm shift, any analysis of the potential future conflict, or any conclusions upon the end of such conflicts could be challenging, or even impossible. 26 www.fragoutmag.com www.fragoutmag.com