Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1446249
more time, also requiring the involvement of a foreign partner, espe- cially when it comes to the powerpack - as it happened in the case of the IFV. It is obvious, however, that Poland already has most of the know-how and components available, to develop a new MBT - this refers to FCS and GOC-1/GOD-1 targeting systems that could be used in the devel- opment of a tank turret, without any design modifications required. Software modifications would rather become necessary though. The ZSSW-30 turret drives or stabilizers could be used as a springboard for a heavier manned/unmanned turret for an MBT. HSW S.A. has also signed a deal with Rheinmetall, acquiring a capabil- ity to manufacture 120 mm L44 smoothbore barrels. It cannot be ruled out that cooperation would be extended to L55 barrels or the latest 130 mm Rh130 L51 gun. Poland also has quite rich experience in the development of tank armor solutions, such as the CAWA-2 ceramic-steel armor for MBTs, or ERA- WA-1 and ERAWA-2 ERA solutions. The idea to develop a domestic tank design may be risky, but it is worth considering. In some sense, the M1A2SEPv3 procurement, despite the wave of criticism, may be beneficial for the development of a domes- tic MBT. The Polish Armed Forces would operate around 250 modern M1A2SEPv3 MBTs, and 247 relatively modern vehicles - Leopard 2PL, and Leopard 2A5, as well as 232 legacy PT-91 platforms. This would increase the capabilities of the armored and mechanized units, and buy the Polish defense industry some time to develop a domestic MBT design, with the involvement of foreign partners. The French-German MGCS (Main Ground Combat System), or the US OMT (Optionally Manned Tank) seem to be far-fetched when it comes to their prospectiveness. In the case of MGCS, France and Germany cannot agree on the main gun - 130 mm Rh130 and 140 mm ASCALON remain on the table. Furthermore, the MGCS MBT, or the derived vehi- cles, would be horrendously expensive. Information released suggests that the development of technology demonstrators (not prototypes) could cost up to EUR 1.5 bn. This should also include EUR 199 million covering the preceding efforts. How high is the price of the series-man- ufactured MBT going to be? MGCS is similar to another FR-GER future MBT program - the Euro- panzer project dating back to the 1950s. The conflicting interests of both nations led to the development of two different, yet similar MBT designs - Leopard 1, and AMX-30. A similar scenario may be expected in the case of MGCS. The US OMT future MBT program is another story - it is a part of the broader NGCV (Next-Generation Combat Vehicle) project, alongside the new OMFV (Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle), and RCV (Robotic Combat Vehicle) platforms. The ultimate preliminary concept is to be selected by the US Army in 2022/2023, while the prototype is expected to be rolled out around the year 2030. That vehicle would also be very expensive. We also do not know whether the USA would immediately decide to include it in the export offer. SUMMARY It is difficult to come to a conclusive assessment of the M1A2SEPv3 procurement. On one hand, nothing bad can be said about the vehicles themselves, being some of the latest, and best MBTs of this genera- tion. However, one could have some objections towards the procure- ment process, the lack of offset agreements, or the lack of any, even minor polonization of the MBT, at least at the present stage. The acquisition would certainly entail some chaos that would become present in logistics. However, one should remember that these issues would be short-lived. They would also occur in case of all of the choic- es - Leopard 2A7V (or similar configuration) included - as these MBTs would utilize many new components incompatible with the legacy variants, and they would require a new crew- and servicemen-training program to be put in place. One shall also remember that the legacy platforms - such as the T-72 MBTs, or BWP-1 IFVs, and many other types of heavy equipment - have become obsolete and shall have been replaced a long time ago. This should be a lesson for the decision-makers. The modernization pro- cess shall be a continuous, uninterrupted process in the Armed Forc- es. In any other case, one may fall into a trap formed by 3 decades of backlog, leading to the accumulation of modernization initiatives, where replacement of the equipment is necessary and can no longer be ignored. Spending levels are also becoming higher, and higher, and this is another factor contributing to the challenging nature of mod- ernization. Finally, the Polish Armed Forces may be able to decommission most of its T-72 MBTs and replace them with a modern counterpart. This will buy the Polish MoD some time to scrutinize the reliable solutions in the Wilk program and to launch some related works which would allow for commissioning of the target solution around the year 2030. ANALYSIS