Frag Out! Magazine

included. Based on that, F3EAD – Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Dis- seminate - methodology was employed. Once the terrorist was found, di- rect action was launched with one objective: capture or kill. The intel gath- ered afterward - extracted from the captured person, documents, data in an electronic form - made it possible to broaden and deepen the situational awareness and identify more targets. More importantly, the „economy of motion" concept was adopted - a departure from large-scale operations against high-value assets could have been noted. Instead, numerous and frequent actions were conducted, involving, however, smaller units. The ex- perience gathered could have been used later - especially during the 2011 „Neptune Spear" operation, as well as activities targeting ISIS later on. Not only did air superiority and dominance translate into freedom to con- duct reconnaissance. Even though the guerrillas could have been using IEDs against the west effectively, they did not have any meaningful air defense assets (RPG-7 and firearms cannot be considered as such). Heli- copters going down were rare, despite numerous casualties that occurred in such scenarios. The capabilities provided by the Air Force were not limited to safer trans- port. Numerous land bases, as well as warships capable of hosting aircraft onboard, aerial refueling operations involving both fixed- as well as rota- ry-wing assets, austere field operations, or introduction of new types of aircraft, such as the V-22, translated into a rare, operational, and strategic freedom of maneuver. Tactical mobility in the land domain was ensured thanks to a plethora of vehicles - including APCs and MRAP-class plat- forms. Technology also played a crucial role in other areas. Terrorists or guerril- la sporadically could have accessed night vision technology. This made it possible for the West to gain a huge advantage, operating at night. The intelligence and communication assets made it possible to effectively em- ploy a myriad of PGMs - carried by UCAVs, or coming in the form of AC-130 gunships. This is also what has been missing in the inventory of the adver- sary. It was very pronounced in 2001 and 2002, when the Taliban forces were pushed out of Afghanistan, into Pakistan. The above was possible thanks to the involvement of SOF working closely with the local allies - who related intel required to direct the air assets. These assets depended on the reliable SATCOM and navigation assets - the Taliban, or the Al-Qaeda terrorist could not have disrupted them. SOF could have also used safe, and relatively well-protected bases, as the support facilities for their oper- ations. Even though the bases were targeted by the adversary, this was not a factor that could have stopped the coalition dead in its tracks. Furthermore, even though all of the aforesaid factors diminished the risk of losses, the advancements made in combat medicine and the MEDEVAC domain diminished that risk even further, compared to other conflicts. Similarly, as in the case of past conflicts, support for the local allies was important. It was rendered in a form of training, mentoring, and consulting, and through the provision of resources that the local units did not have at their disposal. Both in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, or other areas, it was assumed that ultimately, the trained local forces, regular or irregular, or lo- cal SOF, would be able to take over the burden of combat. This was doable. There was one, very serious „but", standing in the way. 50 www.fragoutmag.com

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