Frag Out! Magazine

Establishing and equipping the local forces, and provision of the west- ern-style training were doable and led to numerous, successful operations. However, this came at a price - as those forces were dependent on external support, also when it came to logistics, assuming that aircraft and helicop- ters may be airborne, radios are usable, not to mention the support in the form of artillery and reconnaissance assets. The presence of the western forces there was also political in nature. The stage featured an additional, strong actor, acting as a stronger ally, with a deep pocket. The Americans managed to neutralize Al-Qaeda in Iraq and establish tribe militias, fighting the fundamentalists (the so-called Sunni Awakening). In Afghanistan, local, highly potent armed forces were established. However, as the Americans left Iraq in late 2011, the situation became so dire after 2 years, due to the ISIS offensive, that another armed intervention became a must. The situation in Afghanistan is similar - results of limitations of the US support for the local forces are clearly visible. It turned out that military support can be effective, provided that it is continuous, not temporary. These conditions, defined by the fight against an unconventional, non-state actor also had an impact on the transformation of SOF - when during the long-term operations the individual units rotated their task groups on site. In the case of the USSOCOM - with the SOF component having a significant size, as opposed to other states - not only was the structure expanded quantitatively, but also when it comes to the set of available capabilities. In particular, special recon units grew in size. Separate elements tasked solely with reconnaissance were also being established - such as the Brit- ish SRR - Special Reconnaissance Regiment. When fighting the guerilla, conventional intelligence-gathering platforms are not always useful, for reasons that are quite obvious. The increases in scale and tempo of oper- ations, and an increased role of direct action also translated into a greater necessity to use kinetically-enabled forces - these components were also being reinforced. The new reality is referred to as the „Great Power Competition" (between the United States of America, Russia, and China). It also entails a new set of challenges and problems. A hybrid or conventional conflict that openly involves the superpowers (or proxies - smaller states or guerilla), is an entirely different theater. When the US SOF got involved in Syria, they faced an unpleasant surprise, as the Russian EW interrupted communications and spoofed the GPS signal. Gen- eral Raymond Thomas, USSOCOM Commander, in 2018 directly stated that Syria is the most adverse EW environment globally, due to the actions un- dertaken by the adversaries - this was interpreted as a reference to Russia. The presence of IADS and land-based cruise and ballistic missiles, enemy combat aircraft, and naval assets translates into limited operational free- dom, as opposed to what the Western forces have been enjoying over the past 3 decades - the US military in particular. This does not refer to the my- thologized, impenetrable A2AD bubbles. It concerns a return to well-known threats and modern ways to counter those threats. For instance, airborne delivery and extraction of SOF in the AoR is now an obvious method. The presence of air defense means that high altitude drop or use of aircraft to penetrate the perimeter at a low level may be detected and prevented. Thus it is required to carry out reconnaissance in advance, to identify the possible gaps in radar coverage, detect the air defense assets, and designate the areas of responsibility assigned to the enemy air assets. Alternatively, a local and temporary advantage may be gained through neutralization of the aforesaid assets (air defenses, radars, combat aviation). The above means that fighter and strike aircraft need to be involved, alongside electronic warfare assets and several other resourc- es, such as aerial refueling platforms, or cruise missiles. Another option is to employ submarines to covertly penetrate the area of operations. The divers may covertly leave a submerged submarine, while the submarine itself may also be a carrier of other submersible craft. How- ever, here limitations are imposed by the availability of the vessels and well-trained troops, as well as by the area of operations that needs to be located in the vicinity of the coast. Potentially, assets could also be deployed in the enemy territory before the conflict. In contemporary reality, this is complicated, risky, but doable. Still, the approach as such requires a good orchestration of intelligence opera- tions, with a particular emphasis placed on the agents working in the area. The stay-behind method offers a greater chance of success. Then, all of the preparations done to covertly deploy special forces take place on the own territory, and the resistance infrastructure can be prepared a long time ahead. However, it is possible only where it shall be assumed that the given area is certain to be taken over by the enemy. What is worse, contrary to the lightly armed guerilla or terrorists, the state-actors remain in possession of an expansive arsenal of defensive means (both in a form of security detail, as well as the police, or para- military units staying in the back), and they also have the administrative support at their disposal. The risk that a special operations squad would be detected and neutralized grows significantly. In the case of direct actions, even when approaching the targets covertly makes it possible to conduct an attack that results in the completion of an objective, the enemy may rap- idly cut off and search the area, leading to dispersal of the squad, or sever- al squads, completing that mission. As a result, the events that had taken 51 www.fragoutmag.com ANALYSIS

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