Frag Out! Magazine

place during the past conflicts (Bravo Two Zero scenario from Iraq, or the jinxed Red Wings operation from Afghanistan) and that have gained a lot of media attention, may become far more common in the upcoming future. The above does not mean that the SOF component will become obsolete, not playing any significant role in a potential conventional conflict. Un- doubtedly, reconnaissance - the least kinetic, and the most covert role - would be the most important task, as it used to be in the past. The future battlespace would be dominated by PGMs, meaning that if these are to be employed effectively, precise and accurate intel would be needed to detect, designate, and track targets, as well as in the process of assess- ing whether the given strike has been successful. This may be done both through patrol and surveillance operations in designated perimeters and areas, through the placement of sensors there, or by using other methods, adequately addressing the intelligence collection requirements. It is not difficult to note that similar activities may also be carried out by long-range reconnaissance elements, formally not being a part of SOF. It is also possible to launch direct action, through the designation of tar- gets for strike assets, as well as conventional raids or ambushes aimed at the destruction of assets and infrastructure vital for the adversary. How- ever, disclosing one's presence is risky here, as it immediately provokes a reaction on the part of the enemy forces. Increasing the firepower that remains at disposal of SOF is one of the plausible solutions. Many targets do not require major forces to be used, to take over the given object or facil- ity. Disabling a rocket battery/SAM site can be accomplished by launching an ATGM, such as Spike, or using loitering munitions to destroy the radar or the command vehicle. One should assume that the greater the risk, the higher value the target should have - operations as such shall target HVAs - High-Value Assets. It is also rational for activities as such not to be taking place in a way that would support the conventional forces - for instance, during landing operations. The above means that Direct Action operations would be relatively rare during the hypothetical war. Ultimately, personnel recovery missions would also be a relevant task. These activities are usually conducted by separate CSAR elements, how- ever, the SOF may employ unconventional tactics or methods to rescue the personnel. The same applies to POW rescue operations. However, this does not exhaust the list of possible missions that could in- volve the Special Operations Forces in the future. Apart from a convention- al conflict, hybrid warfare also remains a burning problem. Given its nature, this is a domain where the SOF's role would be critical, given this branch's capacity to provide military support through training and consultancy and to support counter-irregular warfare activities. These actions, if launched during peacetime, make it possible to establish a network of allies and partners that could be potentially used in a crisis, and during the war. Furthermore, the SOF component may also conduct other operations against the hybrid threats. The fact that SOF does not use MBTs and long- range artillery means that direct action may be covert, and that escalation may be avoided if the aggressor intends to have one. Putting it bluntly: 52 www.fragoutmag.com

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