Frag Out! Magazine

even a relatively large SOF component may be easily hidden. This is im- possible in the case of a mechanized battalion that can be easily identified, due to the equipment it uses. Furthermore, given the recent experiences and profile of the hybrid conflict, the potentials involved are diminished. The adversary may employ terrorist methods and guerilla tactics, thus becoming a perfect target to be neutral- ized by the Special Forces. Even when the enemy uses advanced armament and heavy equipment - like in Ukraine - the scope within which these assets were used was, and still is limited, as volunteers and rebels are the oper- ators and crews - this means that assets as such are easier to neutralize. Armed conflicts in areas that are distant from Europe - Africa in particular - would be taking on a hybrid form soon in the future. As the superpowers would engage in rivalry again, local conflicts would also take on such form, and local guerillas or authorities would be supported by the superpowers, as in the past - one of the three, not two, like in the old days. Thus, it is worth noting that the UK has started to establish a new tactical element - Army Special Operations Brigade - formed by four battalions that would work as consultants and instructors, supporting regular and irregu- lar allied forces. Meanwhile, six units that are a part of the conventional force structures have been established in the US, referred to as the Secu- rity Forces Assistance Brigades. They are tasked with similar objectives, complementing the SOF operations - undertaken by the „Green Berets", and smaller units. Notably, the United Kingdom, not to mention the United States, are the top of the tops, when it comes to their military and economic potential. These states do need tools that have a global impact. These factors mean that the evolution of SOF, and the military as a whole, in the West, may go in circles, when it comes to the scope of tasks as- signed to such units. We may be going back towards the Cold War order. Support tasks and recon alongside conventional, open warfare, may be treated as a priority, at the level that is equivalent to the one associated with unconventional activities in the context of hybrid warfare, or other unconventional, or irregular operations. A question may emerge, whether the trends of increased defense spending could translate into heightened levels of financing for the conventional forces. A risk as such indeed shall be taken into account, especially in the case of states that are not at the superpower level, specifically in Europe. Poland is a good example here - a medium-sized country that faces a threat of open or hybrid aggression from Russia. It may be tempting to go back in time and implement cuts that affect the SOF branch, and diminish it to relatively small recon units, working to bring the benefits to the conventional forces. The fact that the hybrid threat exists alone dictates that the role and tasks of the Special Operations Forces are placed in a much broader context. This applies to activities that are initiated domestically (when supporting the Police), with regional allies (supporting their Armed Forces and uni- formed services), and in a broader context as well. Putting the SOF into use makes it possible to make its own, rare, unique contribution to the allied operations. And this translates directly into a political benefit, also increas- ing the probability that allied help would be delivered, if needed. Estonia had good reasoning, when the government decided to support the French activities in Mali, by deploying a SOF element there. 53 www.fragoutmag.com ANALYSIS

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