Frag Out! Magazine

EVOLUTION OF SOF EVOLUTION OF SOF B etween 1939 and 1945 the special operations, involving specially established, trained, and equipped units, tasked with completing military and political objectives with the use of unconventional means, different from the ones used by the regular forces, have first become a tool used by all sides of the conflict. Nonetheless, the gene- sis, structures, and tasks did differ. This is visible in a review of the Polish forces as such, existing at the time. Polish military units - in the West, and the East, and sabotage/resistance elements that were formed in Poland, similarly to other units of other armies, were dealing with a broad spectrum of tasks, ranging from irregular warfare, recon, direct actions (DA), POW and hostage rescue operations (HRO) to finish with. During WW2 special operations were taking place primarily on land, and at sea, involving submarines, fast boats, and kayaks. Air elements support- ing special operations were also created by some countries. These units varied. They included the Polish 1586th Special Operations Squadron, us- ing heavy bombers to covertly deliver personnel and equipment, the US 1st Commando Group, conducting operations in China, Burma, and India (equipped with sailplanes, airlifters, fighter aircraft, and R-4 helicopters), or the German KG200, operating captured allied aircraft, such as the B-17 bombers. At the same time, several WW2 SOF units had a temporary pro- file, as they were established ad hoc, to address the urgent needs of the individual theaters. Their profiles varied, ranging from small squads formed by the intelligence, to light infantry, where company-sized and larger units were formed. The scope and results of operations also varied. A certain number of the undertaken operations brought in tactical and operational benefits, proving that relatively small elements using an element of surprise, could be quite painful for the enemy. For instance, Italian and British naval operations, including raids involving miniature submarines, could result in damage of battleships, or, as in the case of the commando operation in St. Nazaire - limit their operational capabilities within the given area. The SOF activities also created other benefits. Covert reconnaissance made it possible to col- lect tactical intel for landing operations, but also, as during Operation Bit- ing, to capture important enemy equipment (German radar), which made it possible to implement relevant countermeasures. Interruption of supplies also resulted in worsening of the situation at the frontline, while the threat of „behind the lines" strikes in the relatively safe areas forced the Germans to use more of their assets there, not at the frontline. The war's result was however dependent on conventional operations, not on SOF. This refers to battles involving armored divisions and corps, stra- tegic bombing, and the fight for naval supremacy. As the time went by, it turned out - especially in the West - that it is easier to send several, or several hundred bombers, to destroy a command site, railway infrastruc- ture, or a factory, instead of counting on a small squad to infiltrate the enemy infrastructure, carry out its mission, and return to base, or at least, start resistance locally. The emergence of missiles and nukes meant that the firepower of conventional forces would be growing. Furthermore, the temporary, or even ad hoc profile of numerous SOF elements meant that it 46 www.fragoutmag.com

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