Frag Out! Magazine

and more nations have begun to work on their expeditionary and interven- tion capabilities, also when it comes to special operations. In Germany, two out of three long-range reconnaissance companies in the Army were disbanded. The KSK unit replaced them, tasked with expeditionary and counter-terrorist missions. In the Netherlands, the small, 1-company Korps Commandotroepen unit grew four-fold. Special Operations Command has been established in France. Poland, in 1990, established the GRO unit. It was subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs at first. 9/11 served as another catalyst here. NATO became involved in Afghani- stan, Iraq, and other exotic locations around the world. The existing units were being quantitatively expanded, as each of the Green Beret groups (SF- GA's) grew from three to four battalions. The 75th Ranger Regiment and SEAL Teams also grew in size. Furthermore, entirely new units were also formed, such as Raiders/MARSOC in the USMC, or SRR and SFSG in the UK. Finally, Poland, following years of reforms, ultimately created an entirely new branch of its military - Special Forces - initially including 3, then 5 special operations units. The branch was accompanied by a training center and an air squadron subordinated to the Special Forces Command. The Global War on Terror solidified how the SOF elements were being used. This has been, and still is, an asymmetrical conflict, with a confrontation of states, and non-state actors - terrorists and guerilla. Even though the asym- metrical profile is often portrayed through the lens formed by factors that differentiated, and still differentiate guerillas from regular forces, such as the ability to blend in the society, and greater local cultural and social cap- ital that they use to their benefit, contrary to the intervening states, this did not form the whole picture. The Western SOF, often working with the local forces, had a chance to make use of the positive asymmetry, since the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, or ISIS were much weaker, tactically, and equipment-wise. The consequences here have been shown by the events in Iraq, for instance. At the beginning of the war, when Hussein's forces were the main adversary, quantitatively large, but with weak weapons at their disposal, SOF was being used exten- sively, paving the way for the main forces invading Iraq from Kuwait, and carrying out operations in the West and the North. When it turned out that not only the former Hussein's regime troops are involved, and the Ameri- cans are also facing large, well-organized groups of Sunni fundamentalists associated with Al-Qaeda, the SOF was the primary countermeasure. The Counter-Terrorist machine established by the US JSOC, of massive size, had several sources of intel at its disposal, including a myriad of re- connaissance platforms introduced into use at the time, at a mass scale. Unmanned and manned aircraft were capable of spending hours over the given area, tracking the suspicious persons. The aerial reconnaissance platforms were working hand-in-hand with other assets, HUMINT, and COMINT (tools analyzing mobile phone activities and the Internet) means 49 www.fragoutmag.com ANALYSIS

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