Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1467328
3. Limited use of force, involving solely missile and air assets. In a scenario like this one, the air force and missiles, such as Iskander or Kalibr, could potentially be used to disable the Ukrainian critical infrastructure (command posts, communications network, power plants, power grid, road network), in a manner similar to the one employed in military operations by the US. This could lead to the infliction of pressure on Ukraine, under the pain of continued attacks, or escalation. 4. Limited land invasion. A scenario as such could translate into an attempt to take over only a certain portion of the Ukrainian territory. An attack here could have the objective of taking over Donbas or creating a land corridor towards Crimea. This would mean that Russia would take over those areas, either by incorporating them into the Russian territory or by establishing a "people's republic", based on puppet authorities. In the worst- case scenario, a major part of Ukraine could've been taken over, with that territory ending at the banks of the Dnieper River. Another element of such a scenario could involve an indication that Kyiv's pro-western stance remains ineffective. Both the loss in the war, and the somewhat degrading peace treaty signed would lead to the shift of power, and establishment of a Pro-Russian, or less-pro-Western government in Kyiv. 5. Full-scale invasion, aimed at taking control of Ukraine in its entirety, with establishing a puppet government (authorities coming in by main battle tanks), and creating an occupation- based set of administrative organs. Before the war, the last scenario had seemed to be the least probable. It would require taking over the capital city and forcing the legal authorities to surrender. Russia would need to take over the whole, or the majority of the Ukrainian territory. The occupation authorities would need to face strong, passive, and active resistance, including armed resistance. This would require the use of major forces, while not many people would be willing to collaborate with the occupants. The recognition of the "People's Republics" in Donbas by Russia on Feb. 21 created an impression that we would be witnessing variants 1, 2, or, 4- in the worst-case scenario. One could have come to a conclusion, based on the available intel, that Russia would be very much advantageous. This was also a result of several pre- observed factors. The Russian Army had a quantitative advantage. For instance, the estimates regarding Russian military aviation suggested that in 2021 the Russians have had 1108 to 1527 fighter, bomber, and attack aircraft at their disposal. The "Military Balance 2022" suggested that the armored forces included 2927 MBTs in active units, 10200 MBTs in reserve units, along with 5180 IFVs, 6050 APCs, and 14000 reserve vehicles with varying availability. Even the smallest numbers, for the Navy, are impressive, when compared to other nations. Apart from the floating smoke screen creator with a flat deck - the Kuznetsov aircraft carrier, the Russian fleet includes 4 cruisers (the fifth one is being overhauled), 10 Destroyers, 16 Frigates, 98 miscellaneous surface combatants, including corvettes, small missile boats, OPVs, and 49 submarines. This does not mean that the numbers match the reality of course. The availability and readiness may vary, while the equipment in storage may remain in varying conditions. It would take time to prep it for use. Analyzing this potential, one should also take into account the modernization effort made by the Russian military. Su-35 or Su- 34, artillery systems, missile systems, and EW assets, were all being procured. Modernization also happened in the armored and mechanized units - more than 1000 T-72B3 MBTs - an upgraded variant of the T-72 - were acquired. Some of the modernization programs did not yield results as expected - this concerns the plan to manufacture the new T-14 Armata MBTs. One of those vehicles suffered from spectacular damage during the Moscow Victory Day Parade. However, it still seemed that Russia would be advantageous anyway. Ukraine owned only 858 MBTs in active service (along with 1000 in reserves), and only 95-105 combat aircraft, along with several aircraft that remained unflyable. The deliveries of armament from the West included solely light weapons, including anti-tank weapons, MANPADS, reconnaissance systems, and UAVs. Analyses preceding the war suggested that Russia would rapidly establish air superiority. Incapacitating the Ukrainian air force and air defenses would facilitate offensive operations involving airborne units - in line with the previous operations, conducted both during the exercises, such as "Zapad", as well as other armed conflicts. Surprising most of the beholders and analysts, Russia launched a different kind of war on February 24th. Indeed, the air force and the missile units were involved in the first strikes. The land www.fragoutmag.com