Frag Out! Magazine

Frag Out! Magazine #36

Frag Out! Magazine

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operation was launched simultaneously, in several regions. After the first couple of days, following the airborne operation in Gostomel, a different picture of the war could be painted. The attempt to take over the large airport in the Kyiv suburbs suggested that the Russians are willing to take over the capital city rapidly. The airborne operation involving helicopters, targeting the airfield, would make it possible to bring in more troops and fighting vehicles by aircraft. These would be later joined by land units coming from Belarus. As we know, the airborne component was already airborne, but a Ukrainian counterattack made this plan a failure. Notably, the Russians launched this operation breaking all of the rules for activities as such. They did not use an element of surprise. No local air superiority was achieved. They were not able to cut off the Ukrainian reinforcements. One of the Ukrainian elements, during the fights, was deployed near the airfield by helicopters as well. The hypothesis assuming that an attack would take place, decapitating the Ukrainian defense by a rapid taking of Kyiv or immediate capture or kill operation against the authorities, and establishment of a new government brought in by MBTs or helicopters cannot be perceived solely through the lens of military power, but also within the context of politics or even strategic culture. On one hand, there is a public view and belief that the Russian and Ukrainian nations are united and that there is no separate identity between Ukraine and Russia, with the Russian national identity superseding the Ukrainian one. The pro- Western Ukrainian elites meanwhile are viewed as a hostile element that needs to be removed. Furthermore, Putin himself, as well as a major portion of those elites, come from the military structures, including intelligence and counterintelligence, or even political Police, considering the Soviet reality. The Russian elites form a Mafia-like structure now. The positions taken are used for personal and monetary gain. It is possible that by living a lie, a life of manipulation, theft, and fraud, the elites concluded that social behaviors are resulting on the ground of manipulation or willingness to gain profit. Briefly speaking, taking this point of view, if people come out on the streets protesting or criticizing the authorities, the cause for that does not stem from their dissatisfaction, they are rather manipulated, or bribed by some diabolical conspiracy. Maybe it was assumed that after the legal government in Kyiv is overthrown, the resistance of the society would be minor, negligible, or even the military units entering Kyiv would be treated as liberators. Maybe it was expected that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not engage in a large-scale defensive operation. The decision-making process made some omissions of facts tied to the political and social context - the high readiness among the members of society, with people eagerly joining the territorial defense units. Apart from the first Russian failure, more would follow. They have not been able to establish any air superiority, at the time when this article was written. On March 13th, the Ukrainian Air Force remains combat capable, losing just a minor portion of its potential. The GBAD system is also active. However, the air www.fragoutmag.com

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