Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1467328
ensured thanks to a plethora of vehicles - including APCs and MRAP-class platforms. Technology also played a crucial role in other areas. Terrorists or guerrilla sporadically could have accessed night vision technology. This made it possible for the West to gain a huge advantage, operating at night. The intelligence and communication assets made it possible to effectively employ a myriad of PGMs - carried by UCAVs, or coming in the form of AC-130 gunships. This is also what has been missing in the inventory of the adversary. It was very pronounced in 2001 and 2002, when the Taliban forces were pushed out of Afghanistan, into Pakistan. The above was possible thanks to the involvement of SOF working closely with the local allies - who related intel required to direct the air assets. These assets depended on the reliable SATCOM and navigation assets - the Taliban, or the Al-Qaeda terrorist could not have disrupted them. SOF could have also used safe, and relatively well-protected bases, as the support facilities for their operations. Even though the bases were targeted by the adversary, this was not a factor that could have stopped the coalition dead in its tracks. Furthermore, even though all of the aforesaid factors diminished the risk of losses, the advancements made in combat medicine and the MEDEVAC domain diminished that risk even further, compared to other conflicts. Similarly, as in the case of past conflicts, support for the local allies was important. It was rendered in a form of training, mentoring, and consulting, and through the provi- sion of resources that the local units did not have at their disposal. Both in Afghanistan, as well as in Iraq, or other areas, it was assumed that ultimately, the trained local forces, regular or irregular, or local SOF, would be able to take over the burden of combat. This was doable. There was one, very serious "but", standing in the way. Establishing and equipping the local forces, and provision of the western-style training were doable and led to numerous, successful operations. However, this came at a price - as those forces were dependent on external support, also when it came to logistics, assuming that aircraft and helicopters may be airborne, radios are usable, not to men- tion the support in the form of artillery and reconnaissance assets. The presence of the western forces there was also political in nature. The stage featured an additional, ANALYSIS