Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1467328
What is worse, contrary to the lightly armed guerilla or terrorists, the state-actors remain in possession of an expansive arsenal of defensive means (both in a form of security detail, as well as the police, or paramilitary units staying in the back), and they also have the administrative support at their disposal. The risk that a special operations squad would be detected and neutralized grows significantly. In the case of direct actions, even when approaching the targets covertly makes it possible to conduct an attack that results in the completion of an objective, the enemy may rapidly cut off and search the area, leading to dispersal of the squad, or several squads, completing that mission. As a result, the events that had taken place during the past conflicts (Bravo Two Zero scenario from Iraq, or the jinxed Red Wings operation from Afghanistan) and that have gained a lot of media atten- tion, may become far more common in the upcoming future. The above does not mean that the SOF component will become obsolete, not play- ing any significant role in a potential conventional conflict. Undoubtedly, reconnais- sance - the least kinetic, and the most covert role - would be the most important task, as it used to be in the past. The future battlespace would be dominated by PGMs, meaning that if these are to be employed effectively, precise and accurate intel would be needed to detect, designate, and track targets, as well as in the process of assessing whether the given strike has been successful. This may be done both through patrol and surveillance operations in designated perimeters and areas, through the placement of sensors there, or by using other methods, adequately addressing the intelligence collection requirements. It is not difficult to note that similar activities may also be carried out by long-range reconnaissance elements, formally not being a part of SOF. It is also possible to launch direct action, through the designation of targets for strike assets, as well as conventional raids or ambushes aimed at the destruc- tion of assets and infrastructure vital for the adversary. However, disclosing one's presence is risky here, as it immediately provokes a reaction on the part of the enemy forces. Increasing the firepower that remains at disposal of SOF is one of the plausible solutions. Many targets do not require major forces to be used, to take over the given object or facility. Disabling a rocket battery/SAM site can be accomplished by launching an ATGM, such as Spike, or using loitering munitions to destroy the radar or the command vehicle. One should assume that the greater the risk, the higher value the target should have - operations as such shall target HVAs - High-Value Assets. It is also rational for activities as such not to be taking place in a way that would support the conventional forces - for instance, during landing operations. The above means that Direct Action operations would be relatively rare during the hypothetical war. Ultimately, personnel recovery missions would also be a relevant task. These ac- tivities are usually conducted by separate CSAR elements, however, the SOF may employ unconventional tactics or methods to rescue the personnel. The same ap- plies to POW rescue operations. However, this does not exhaust the list of possible missions that could involve the Special Operations Forces in the future. Apart from a conventional conflict, hybrid warfare also remains a burning problem. Given its nature, this is a domain where the SOF's role would be critical, given this branch's capacity to provide military support through training and consultancy and to support counter-irregular warfare activities. These actions, if launched during peacetime, make it possible to estab- lish a network of allies and partners that could be potentially used in a crisis, and during the war. Furthermore, the SOF component may also conduct other operations against the hybrid threats. The fact that SOF does not use MBTs and long-range artillery means that direct action may be covert, and that escalation may be avoided if the aggres- sor intends to have one. Putting it bluntly: even a relatively large SOF component may be easily hidden. This is impossible in the case of a mechanized battalion that can be easily identified, due to the equipment it uses. Furthermore, given the recent experiences and profile of the hybrid conflict, the potentials involved are diminished. The adversary may employ terrorist methods and guerilla tactics, thus becoming a perfect target to be neutralized by the Special Forces. Even when the enemy uses advanced armament and heavy equipment - like in Ukraine - the scope within which these assets were used was, and still is limited, as volunteers and rebels are the operators and crews - this means that assets as such are easier to neutralize. Armed conflicts in areas that are distant from Europe - Africa in particular - would be taking on a hybrid form soon in the future. As the superpowers would engage in rivalry again, local conflicts would also take on such form, and local guerillas or authorities would be supported by EVOLUTION OF SOF www.fragoutmag.com