Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1497523
The fact is, that Polish law currently includes no direct definition of hybrid operations or threats. That makes it far more difficult to designate the organs that should handle this. When speaking of fires, we intuitively think of firemen, when speaking of crimes, we think of the police, and when thinking of espionage, we usually refer to the Internal Security Agency, or Military Counterintelligence. The hybrid threats may come in a form of a person who, working for foreign intelligence, commits a crime resulting in arson, for instance. Someone could say that the fire is still a fire, and the fire brigades do not care about the cause, and it is only important to extinguish it. When speaking of hybrid warfare, the fire may not be a result of an accident, lack of care, or intentional action, but it is just a means that is used to achieve a broader objective - destabilization, or proving that the state remains unable to work efficiently. The perpetrators may want to make the efforts of the fire brigade more challenging, by cutting off the access roads with vehicles left behind, or by using weapons against the fire brigade, ensuring destruction of the burning facility. On the other hand, that scenario is relatively simple, as one can refer to specific regulations or procedures regarding criminal activities, such as arson or espionage. Even though espionage is a matter of proof - when dealing with a person contacting a representative of a foreign nation and working for them - the matter is far more convoluted when no direct contact as such happens. A situation in which no bilateral contact as such happens is a problem when the perpetrator acts solely under the influence of propaganda. Even if such a person fully endorses the Russian policy, and admits that this was the main reason behind the undertaken course of action, no espionage accusations can be made here. The said challenges illustrate the key problem associated with countering and reacting to hybrid threats. The attacker uses a myriad of tools, and fuses them, with a high degree of freedom. For instance, when wanting the attacked nation to behave in a specific way, economic pressure may be used, e.g. when it comes to the delivery of fuels for the attacked state, and also disinformation may be employed - with apparent interruption of deliveries or fault. Then rumors may be spread about a catastrophic shortage of fuel, which then could result in panic and a crisis of trust expressed towards the government. The matter may be easier, as in the case of Russia the state authorities, and the intelligence services in general, yield more control over different domains of life. Responding to an attack as such would involve economic, and information assets. It is easier said than done, but in democracies, even when the government owns the whole or parts of some strategic enterprises, not always is it able to impose its will on them. Making changes in the media sphere is even more convoluted, as state broadcast agencies enjoy a lot of freedom and independence - as it happens in the case of BBC for instance. Situations in which content publication is banned or imposed, as state authorities may dictate, are usually associated with wars, or other emergencies. Apart from the most general limitations, other barriers shall also be taken into the account here. One of these barriers is the internal legal and procedural framework used by the given service, formation, or institutions, and the same goes for habits and customs, regarding the role of own formation or organ, training methods, or tasks at hand. The above may result in the silo-containerization of organizations, namely a situation in which all state administration departments or uniformed services function enclosed in vertical silo-like structures, isolated from the remaining organs, focusing on the key problems within their jurisdiction. That can be illustrated by a problem related to the operations undertaken by the Police. Simply speaking, the effectiveness of those operations is usually measured based on indicators quantifiable internally - the number of issued speeding tickets for instance. If a Police patrol had a preventative role in the given area, with no crime detected, then the quantifiable benefit is granted to other entities, such as citizens who did not fall victim to burglars or muggers for instance. This can also be exemplified by another example, closer to hybrid threats, and similar to the Spanish divers' affair. The UAV (drone) flights are regulated by the EU and domestic aviation regulations, and zones, where limitations are imposed, can be designated based on those regulations. Formally, the security service can use measures allowing them to take over control, or destroy a drone conducting flights in an area as such if assets usable for that purpose are available. They cannot intervene, however, outside the protected perimeter. And this is not tantamount to the restricted area. The suspicious activities - drone flying without permission, drone flying too high, drones repeatedly flying close to the given facility, or drones flying during weird hours - may require the Police ANALYSIS