Frag Out! Magazine

challenging, take a lot of time, and there is no gu- arantee of success. However, it may always turn out that someone could be convinced to connect a pre-formatted USB stick to a work computer or, not being aware of a threat, to open an infec- ted email attachment. Persons who are openly working with foreign intelligence agencies may also be used to support sabotage operations, granting the saboteurs access to the protected facilities for instance. HUMINT is relatively cheap, in comparison to other intelligence operations. One just needs to know how to reach the persons who possess the information that remains desirable for the given intelligence agency, and how one may establish covert communications. This is an old game, the technology can only be of help here. However, it is easy to imagine operations conducted without computers or smartphones, but with the use of tools that have been known for decades. Flexibility is another advantage of HUMINT. This kind of operation is not tied to a single platform or type of equipment. Let's use Russia as an example: agents could be recruited by intelli- gence agents conducting operations from within the Russian territory, targeting persons visiting Russia on business or leisure trips. That path has been closed now, to a significant degree. Another traditional channel used here is being recruited by „diplomats". In the case of Russia, everyone knew that people not associated with intelligence services were a minority at the Russian diploma- tic postings. This area may also have limited re- levance now. Only in some areas in Poland mainta- ining any relations, apart from formal ones, with the Russian spie...hold it, diplomats is far from being suspicious. The third option is the recru- itment process conducted by spies, by persons who are the so-called „illegals" - officers or colla- borators of the Russian intelligence, using a false identity to stay in Poland. This group may include journalists, businessmen, or even scientists - to justify their interest in critical infrastructure for instance. That may lead to false flag recruitment processes, in which the recruited person is be- ing misled. A person asked for information by a Russian diplomat may behave differently from a person thinking they are talking to a journalist, or a representative of a think-tank dealing with, officially, matters related to the EU. Another me- thod of approach may also be used. The NATO of- ficers' social circle in Naples was being infiltrated by a woman nicknamed Maria Adela. Officially, she was working in the jewelry industry. The aforesaid review of HUMINT capabilities also makes one ask a question: are there any countermeasures available within that scope? To understand this threat better, one should, in particular, focus on the ways employed to obtain a source of HUMINT, especially the motivation that drives people to work with foreign intelli- gence services. The motivation by which the agent is driven is often described with the use of the MICE acronym: Money, Ideology, Compro- mise, Ego; whereas the decisions made by the person engaging in collaboration may be dictated by more than a single factor. Spying for money is a frequent scenario. This may be motivated by an intent to put troubles (such as debt) behind, an intent to rapidly raise one's standard of living, or an intent to obtain an easy, but stable source of extra income. In the case of cooperation driven by ideology, the matters are simple as well. The ideological fac- tors play a key role here, and these include the political ideology, ethnicity, or even religion, or principles and beliefs followed by the given per- son. In the current context, sympathy for the Russians, or being convinced that the Russian policy is a peaceful one, can be listed among the motivating factors. Does it sound weird? Unfor- tunately, stances as such sometimes emerge - and other attitudes that may be of use. Simple blackmail is another possibility. Blackmail is based on kompromat - the information or per- sonal or professional matters about the given person that, if exposed, may cause that person trouble. It is important to make the person sca- red enough to force him/her to cooperate. Personal motives are the fourth option. Persons as such usually engage in cooperation with fo- reign intelligence agencies, as they feel unap- preciated at work, or they may want to prove something. Detecting a foreign intelligence agent, or inve- stigating of a spy network are tasks usually as- signed to the counterintelligence services. This does not mean that counterintelligence is the only relevant organ important in the process of preventing sabotage or espionage. Quite the opposite - especially in the area of prevention, more effort is required. One may use an analo- gy here, referring to the process of preventing acts of terror. It is a good practice to inform the police about unattended luggage or packages in public spaces. In 99% of the cases, such lugga- ge or bag left unattended are left there because of a lack of care, not criminal intent. Informing the authorities about suspicious events and situ- ations heightens the chance to detect that 1% of events when an actual attack attempt is very much plausible. ANALYSIS

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