Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1513581
plant and avionics, named PZL Kania. Medium-sized Sokół and lightweight SW-4 platforms were offered as well. Kania was not procured by the Armed Forces, as it was only acquired by the Poli- ce, and by the Border Guard. The Armed Forces procured 24 SW-4, solely for training purposes. The highest hopes were associated with Sokół. At least a couple of attempts were made at turning Sokół into an attack helicopter. The first, armed variant made its maiden flight in 1990 - designa- ted W-3U, it carried the Soviet- -made 9K114 ATGMs. However, the Armed Forces did not decide to acquire a platform using So- viet missiles. Further attempts were made at turning Sokół into a gunship, with South African ZT-3, and French HOT-3 missiles. The- se attempts also failed and never reached the series manufacturing stage. Then, a strategic Huzar program was launched, aimed at bringing the developments to the series production stage. Howe- ver, this resulted in a media-lob- bying scandal, with the backdrop in the form of the ATGM selection process. One should also men- tion the fact that the preliminary agreement with Israel regarding the NT-D (now known as Spike) ATGM was signed in 1997, befo- re the electiosn, and the program came to an end during the next term of office. As a result, the Army had several Sokół helicop- ters of different variants at its disposal, including ones carrying armament, while the PZL Świdnik facility was transferred into the hands of private business, beco- ming a part of the Leonardo. An alternative history of the Polish aerospace industry and helicop- ters will not be covered here, but one rule seems to be visible here: without strong political support and finances, and without an ability to find or create a mar- However, the weapons used by those he- licopters did not undergo any upgrades whatsoever. The Mi-24 have not been using ATGMs for a decade now - and guided missiles should be the primary armament for them. Instead, the invento- ry for the Hinds only includes guns and unguided rockets - even with that limited capability, they may be usable, as the Ukrainian war shows. This statement, however, does not apply to the armed Mi- 2, and their 9M14 Malyutka ATGMs. Ad hoc procurement was permissible in the past, especially in the context of foreign deployments, as other nations did. Up- grade of the made-in USSR helicopters had also been a viable option, until 2014 - then, scenarios as such became far more challenging, and impossible post-2022. Not only has it become impossible to source more helicopters, but the spares have become unavailable as well. Domestic manufacturing of proprietary designs was an alternative path here. The domestic industry created a mo- dernization package for the Mi-2 in the 1990s, including western-made power- AVIATION