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Frag Out! Magazine #42

Frag Out! Magazine

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Overpressure* Shock Neutron weapon (K min)** Conventional weapons (kg)*** Separate Separate Separate Separate 1 MPa 1.5 ms 2 20000 1000 0.5 MPa 1.5 ms 2 10000 500 0.3 MPa 1.5 ms 2 6000 250 0.2 MPa 1.5 ms 2 4000 250 0.5 MPa +0.1 MPa * low altitude aerial nuclear explosion, having an impact on the surface of the location of the shelter ** low altitude aerial neutron explosion, at a distance at which the shockwave overpressure levels would not exceed the assumed value, with the K-factor lower than the value listed in the table. *** aerial bunker buster munitions, weight as listed in the table • The facility, when isolated, should maintain the ability to function from 12 to 24 hours, with assumed 30 days of autonomy. Resupply capability is desirable. Shelters as such should have at least 2 levels, 3 levels are preferred. • Apart from the above requirements, the normative document cited here also includes sev-eral other requirements, within the scope of communications, food supplies, accommoda-tion matters, and technical issues. • At a glance, ferroconcrete structures embedded underground, offering high levels of protection would be the perfect solution here. • Referring that to the modern munitions, it seems that most of the Voivodeship level facili-ties shall offer Class II and III protection (structure, plus a building above it), as per the 1985 Resolution of the Country Defense Committee. The author argues that these structures (during stage I of implementation of the plan aimed at boosting the level of state resilience) could fuse functions, acting as Voivodeship ZMP and Police Commander (Voivodeship level) ZMP, and CPR (Rescue Communications Centre). It would also be recommended that the CPR role be assigned to those facilities during peacetime. 17 CPR facilities exist in Poland now. In the areas that are directly threatened by the potential aggression (the easternmost part of Poland), even low-level structures should offer protection levels sufficient to withstand direct hit with tactical- level munitions (152 mm artillery projectiles, 122 mm or 220 mm rocket artillery warheads, and similar assets). To keep the costs of creating a shelter low, the protection levels listed above shall be achieved by combining the protection provided by the shelter, with protection offered by the buildings on the surface - it needs to be not-ed here, that contemporary office buildings are usually based on a ferroconcrete frame. According to research, a six-story ferroconcrete building protects a shelter underneath equivalent to an extra layer of ferroconcrete that is 3.5 meters thick. Empty spaces of the floors above diminish the threat levels when it comes to the threats posed for instance by the BROACH warhead of STORM SHADOW missiles. The Explosively Formed Penetrator does not destroy the walls/ceiling of the shelter, as it first needs to penetrate all the floors above. In the next part of the article, apart from discussing the technicalities, we will also scruti-nize how many and what organs should be given access to shelters in Poland, during the first stage of the process aimed at reinforcing the in-country infrastructure. ANALYSIS

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