Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1519846
is saturated with air defenses. This re- sulted in the growth of artillery units in the regular Ukrainian brigades. The number of units went to two artillery battalions in the newly-formed motori- zed brigades, and up to three battalions in the legacy armored and mechanized brigades. Several new artillery briga- des were also formed, including heavy brigades equipped with heavy tube and rocket artillery assets brought back into service from deep storage. Each of the regular brigades was also suppor- ted by a tank battalion or company. This included airborne assault and marine brigades. In that way, the Ukrainian Ge- neral Staff managed to maximally rein- force the existing brigades, and create several brand new units. The command structure of the UAF became filled with substance up to the limit. What should also be pointed out, is the significant influence the pro-defense organizations had on the reforms - the- se organizations were formed mostly by Ukrainian volunteers. I have already mentioned the efforts they were ma- king during the active phase of the war, between 2014 and 2015. These organi- zations were responsible for supplying the Ukrainian units back then with the missing gear and means of communi- cation. The lack of good quality food, lack of bulletproof vests, or helmets, in essence, the shortage of basic inven- tory needed to fight in half-comforta- ble conditions on the frontline, simply became a symbol of the ineptitude of the state, and of the UAFs, who were asking the citizens to sacrifice for the homeland defense, without the ability to offer them proper support. Many people enrolling in the military becau- se of mobilization felt humiliated by the conditions of service. This area has be- come one of the key matters covered by the reforms, following the conclusion of the Minsk-2 agreements. The new Ukrainian authorities decided to adopt a less-than-conventional approach, simply inviting reputable, respected volunteers to the Ministry of Defense, to create a reform within the scope of equipment and supplies for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It was referred to as the „Volunteer Landing Operation at the Ministry of Defense". That group did its job well. A system for open tendering procedures was created. As time went by, this made the whole supply system more efficient, when it came to food, uniforms, and individual kits. This area played a key role when it came to the comprehension of changes happening in the Ukrainian military back then. The change was not associated with a hi- gher budget, modern equipment, or es- tablishment of the navy. It was rather tied to decent (in Ukrainian conditions) pay, and better service and life con- ditions faced by the troops in the Ar- med Forces. The changes were human- -centered, and the state was trying hard to show that the state's approach towards the soldiers was redefined. This is an important aspect that had an impact on the morale of the UAF and the perception of the military among the members of the Ukrainian society. Support granted by NATO also had a key role in the transformation of the reputation of the UAF. NATO decided to establish a standing training mission in Ukraine. Post-2015, Ukraine was continuously restoring the abandoned, and modernizing the existing training facilities. The stories of atrocious con- ditions at those facilities during the 2014 mobilization have become a part of the Ukrainian army folklore. The mo- dernization, and the enhancement of conditions at those training centers, meanwhile, have become a symbol of recovery. Despite all of those efforts, the needs still outweighed the capa- bilities at hand. The Western support thus had a major role in creating the re- levant combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. The narrative pursued by the Western media post-2022, suggesting that the Western training changed the UAF making them adopt the Western model, replacing the Soviet one, is an overstatement. NATO training in Ukra- ine mainly covered the lower, tactical level of operations. The UAF, following the 2015-2022 reforms, were still largely a military based upon a Soviet foundation, structure- and command chain-wise. This especially applies to the higher levels of the command chain. Despite the massive influx of young offi- cers in the UAF, they co-exist with the generation of „post-Soviet" officers. www.fragoutmag.com