Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1528235
number of dead is smaller, of course, according to the BBC and Mediazona, the number of confirmed deaths (through obituaries or graves) is around 50,000 Russian soldiers, so this number is likely underestimated due to incomplete data, and it is probably much higher. Additionally, there are those permanently incapacitated by injuries or who will die over the coming years due to various reasons (e.g., severe alcoholism or suicides). These numbers are shocking, but it's important to remember that the Russian army has more than a million soldiers, and conscription takes place twice a year, accoun- ting for about a quarter of the Russian military. In terms of equipment, the losses are also severe: over 3,000 tanks have been lost, leaving little doubt about the effective- ness of the Ukrainians. The scale of Russia's reliance on deep reserves is so great that the presence of T-62 tanks on the battlefield is no longer surprising, and reports of even older equipment like T-55s or ad hoc field modifications, especially those that seem particularly absurd, occasionally make the news. This doesn't change the fact that Russia still has signi- ficant capabilities to compensate (at least in terms of num- bers) for the losses already incurred by pulling older batches of equipment from storage and repairing damaged vehicles. This, of course, doesn't provide a full picture of the Russian military. Some units are still equipped with relatively modern weaponry, such as long-range missiles, newer or newly pro- duced tanks, or decent equipment and uniforms. However, as in World War II, these are a minority - elite formations acting as supplements to the sea of cannon fodder, deployed where their use could yield the most benefit. The armed forces may also potentially be used as a hybrid tool to bolster other me- ans of influence, such as disinformation, economic or political pressure, or sabotage and intelligence operations. This could happen only if the outcome of a conflict could be decisively influenced by the open use of armed forces, and it is likely that the navy, air forces, and limited ground forces (including airmobile units) would be used first, with a large-scale opera- tion being the next step. Thus, the potential opponent would likely rely primarily on qu- antitative advantager in the event of open war, supplemented by qualitatively enhancing assets, and in the case of hybrid conflict, primarily on qualitative superiority, supplemented by numerical superiority. Additionally, it should be noted that Russia, with a population of about 141 million, will be able to generate a quantitative superiority in the foreseeable future. This is due not only to demographics but also to the social and political situation. It will be easy to force people, especially from poorer regions, into joining the military and going to the front. This leads to the first key condition for building the future army: as a country in a different demographic situation, we should not aim to match Russia's quantitative advantage with our own advantage in the numbers game, because we won't achieve it. Instead, we can try to prioritize qualitative supe- riority, supplemented by numbers where necessary. www.fragoutmag.com