Frag Out! Magazine
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use a quantitative advantage, as mentioned above, a direct quanti- tative race with Russia makes no sense. However, in the event of a crisis or war, the demand for opera- tional component soldiers will incre- ase because these circumstances will develop into a mobilization and require replenishment for losses. At the same time, it should be noted that there are a number of tasks necessary for maintaining the ove- rall order in the rear, and protect the support structure against sa- botage actions and for maintaining public order, as well as tasks related to supporting operational troops, e.g. in engineering, logistics, and medical support. Additionally, other formations will also develop through mobilization. Another element of the puzzle is the announced non-military formation, which is to be the Corps of Civil Defense, also operating pri- marily in wartime. There will be a need for personnel in all these are- as, not necessarily with the highest level of training, but sufficient to perform basic tasks. Thus, it is worth considering stri- ving to divide the armed forces into several levels. This could be simplified to resemble the system known from the American special forces. By definition, the highest level of re- adiness should be attained by selec- ted tactical units of all branches of armed forces and SOF component. These already consist primarily of professional soldiers. Supplemen- ting them through active reserves is, therefore, obvious. However, to make this simple, let us temporarily focus on the land forces: three divi- sions formally fully developed (11th Armored Cavalry Division, 12th Me- chanized Division, 16th Mechanized Division), a fourth (18th Mechanized Division), which is still being formed, and two (1st Legions Infantry Divi- sion and 8th AK Infantry Division) at the beginning of this process. Moreover, it should be added that existing structures are being expan- ded: divisions will consist of four general combat brigades, and these of four battalions; the division will also have an artillery brigade, a lo- gistics regiment, a reconnaissance battalion, and other subunits in its structure. If such a model of land forces de- velopment is to be maintained, the question automatically arises whether the existing, developed brigades should be treated as the professional core, the highest level. Subsequent brigades and battalions, and even entire divisions (especially the two youngest), could consist of soldiers undergoing voluntary, and if conscription is reinstated, manda- tory basic service, while the profes- sional cadre (or in active reserve) would be designated for command and specialist functions (especially instructor roles). It is also possible to assign part of the individuals who, after completing basic service, de- cide not to continue their military journey to these, training divisions, brigades, and battalions through mobilization assignments, ending up in passive reserve. A similar or- ganizational model can be applied to other units. In the case of re- instating conscription, there are no formal objections to having, for example, a training subunit in each of the Territorial Defense brigades for individuals in basic service who, after training, would constitute a reserve for that particular brigade. Analogous solutions can also be ap- plied in other branches of the Armed Forces, where, in the event of war, the demand for personnel suppor- ting the main effort (e.g., airbase security elements, logistical or engi- neering units) will increase. One more factor must be added. Currently, we are talking about re- inforcing or supplementing already existing formations. However, it is known that there are also (even now) units and other elements that do not function in peacetime, these are deployed during mobilization. This is also a place where there is an opportunity to primarily utilize pas- sive reserves. For this first group of people, a system can be created that rewards volunteers, ensuring www.fragoutmag.com