Frag Out! Magazine
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1. http://duma.gov.ru/news/57528/ 2. https://x.com/DefenceHQ/status/1768927665451360455 3. https://schengen.news/650000-russians-have-fled-russia-many-of-them-to-eu-countries/ 4. https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2024-07-03/short-term-stability-and-long-term-problems-demographic#_ftn15 5. https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/stan-sil-zbrojnych-rosji-po-dwoch-latach-od-agresji-na-ukraine 6. https://www.africanews.com/2024/10/10/africans-recruited-for-russian-jobs-say-they-were-tricked-into-building-ukraine-drones/ Number of Eligible Servicemen in Russia Based on the 2020 census, it is estimated that in 2022, Russia had approximately 66 million men, including: • Circa 6 million men aged 18–30, who are subject to conscription. • Circa 43 million men aged 18–65, who are eligible for mobilization (mobilization applies to senior officers up to 65 years old, junior officers up to 60 years old, and other personnel up to 55 years old). 1 However, among men in the 18–30 age cohort, around 400,000 suffer from chronic illnesses, including approximately 280,000 disabled individuals. Among those subject to mobilization, the numbers are significantly higher, with over 7 million suffering from chronic illnesses, including about 2.5 million disabled individuals. Additionally, within the 18–65 age group, there are approximately one million fathers of at least four children, who are exempt from mobilization. These numbers represent the upper limit of mobilization potential, not accounting for non-demographic factors such as: Individuals exempt due to essential employment in public administration or healthcare (even during war, basic medical care must be maintained); Service members in law enforcement; Workers in certain private- sector jobs exempt from mobilization, such as parts of the IT sector; Single fathers raising children under 16. This group includes both those who have completed basic military training and those who have not. Sergei Shoigu himself stated in 2022 that Russia's mobilization reserve stands at around 25 million people. The above calculations suggest that this number may not be far from reality. However, this figure will gradually decrease due to population aging, younger cohorts available for mobilization will become increasingly smaller. In the next decade, this decline will be relatively minor, averaging no more than 100,000 per year, but by the early 2030s, the annual decline will exceed 300,000. Notably, for the next ten years, the 18– 30 age group (subject to conscription) will continue to grow before it starts declining around 2035. By the late 2030s, this cohort will shrink at a rate of over 100,000 per year, on average. Will Demographics Sustain Russia's War Economy? In a November 7, 2024 speech, Vladimir Putin highlighted Russia's record-low unemployment rate of 2.8% and acknowledged the country's labor shortage. This situation stems from several factors: • An increase in a number of disabled men — a March 16, 2024 report by British military intelligence stated that the number of disabled men aged 31–59 rose from 1.67 million in 2022 to 2.18 million by the end of 2023. 2 • War-related emigration—according to Schengen News, 650,000 Russians have permanently left the country. 3 • A decline in immigration—data from the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) indicate that in 2023, Russia received 560,000 immigrants, a 23% drop from 2022. At the end of 2023, approximately 4 million immigrant workers remained in Russia, 100,000 less than in the last pre-pandemic year. 4 • Natural population decline - the difference between births and deaths since the war began is about 1.1 million, with combat deaths likely excluded from official statistics; • An unspecified number of fallen Russian soldiers; • Expansion of the Russian Armed Forces, according to Anna Maria Dyner, in 2023 alone, around 213,000 professional soldiers joined the military. 5 At the same time, Russia's shift to a war economy is increasing the demand for workers, particularly in the defense industry and related sectors. Given these demographic challenges, Russia's workforce within the society is insufficient to sustain long-term war economy production. The only viable solution is increased immigration, but rising xenophobia in Russian society complicates this process - it would be a major challenge to ensure a constant www.fragoutmag.com