Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1532587
The potential adversary of the Polish Army over the next 20 years is likely to be the Russian military, possibly sup- ported by the Belarusian armed forces, unless there is a significant political shift in Belarus. Russia's strategic goal will be to regain great power status, likely through the restoration of its former sphere of influence and the imposition of a geopolitical order in Europe that favors Moscow. To achieve this, Russia may seek to regain con- trol over the Baltic States, subjugate or neutralize Po- land, weaken or fracture NATO, and potentially undermine the European Union. It could employ both hybrid tactics, such as sabotage and subversion, and conventional mili- tary means, ranging from limited operations (e.g., missile and airstrikes only) to a full-scale land invasion. The nature of this potential adversary shapes the charac- teristics of any future conflict. While hybrid operations may be relatively sophisticated and aimed at causing in- ternal turmoil, conventional Russian warfare still relies on quantitative superiority, achieved with little to no regard for the lives and well-being of its own soldiers. It also depends on relatively simple and inexpensive equipment, supplemented by a smaller quantity of modern and costly systems, as well as maneuver warfare and large-scale infrastructure destruction. Given the unpredictable policies that may be pursued Donald Trump and their potentially damaging effects on U.S.-Europe relations, along with the risk of war in Asia (e.g., a conflict between mainland China and Taiwan), it is necessary to assume that Europe (and Poland) must be capable of conducting effective defensive operations without U.S. support or with only limited assistance (such as air support). Therefore, Poland needs an army that can at least partially balance Russia's military capa- bilities. Quantitative race remains futile. Even accounting for its losses in Ukraine, Russia can continue to produce military equipment, even if it is of low quality. Whether moder- nized or refurbished vehicles are pulled from storage or recovered from the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia is likely to maintain large stockpiles. For example, according to Military Balance data from February 2024, Russia still had 6,000 tanks of various types. Furthermore, if hosti- lities in Ukraine were frozen or ended, especially if Trump pressured Kyiv into signing a deal with Moscow, Russian losses would decrease significantly. ANALYSIS