Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1542142
We must again emphasize doc- trinal differences that still exist in the system — we are talking about reserve exerci- ses within the framework of ac- tive military service, because that is how the legal status reads in 2025 and it has been so since the beginning of the period under discussion. First is the call-up within exerci - ses for "retraining," e.g., a Reserve Personnel Retraining Course — i.e., a change of mi- litary specialty (MOS). In the case of reserve cadets, such a course also serves to make it possible to promote the re- serve cadet to the first officer rank (i.e., to meet the mini- mum requirement of 30 exercise days and to be appointed to a post that requires an officer rank). The second, more basic element is the typical reserve exercises, during which, doc - trinally, soldiers are to ma- intain the skills acquired during ZSW, that is, to perform duties in accordance with the positions listed on mobiliza- tion assignments. This doctrine was implemented — sometimes better, sometimes worse — until 2009, when the decision was made to suspend Basic Military Service, which drastically reduced the influx of reserve soldiers across all personnel. At the same time, a decision was taken to redu - ce the number of reservists called up for exercises to a minimum (to one thousand per year). Minimal call-ups conti- nued, mainly for medical per- sonnel and chaplains, but this affected the training element of the doctrine rather than the conduct of exercises as such. An additional nail in the cof- fin of reserve recruitment was a politically popular measu- re — interestingly, one of the few that was actually imple- mented — namely the removal of the 12-year service limit for professional privates. This was done by an amendment to the Act on Military Servi- ce of Professional Soldiers in January 2016. Before that limit was lifted, a private or senior priva- te could serve only 12 years without acquiring military pension rights — if he was promoted to NCO, the limit no longer applied and he became a "full" professional soldier who acquired normal pension entitlements. Due to patholo - gies in the promotion system, sending people to schools and courses, and appointing pro- moted soldiers to subsequent posts, the number of privates promoted to NCO rank was ne- gligible (it was easier to get promoted "through the line" by coming straight from civilian life), so most left service around age 35, thereby forming a very valuable pool of passi - ve reserves. Such reserve re- sources had the full spectrum of military specialties and could even cover posts nor- mally assigned to NCOs during mobilization. After removing the 12-year limit — justi- fied as "caring for retaining combat-experienced privates" (an argument that was to some ANALYSIS