Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1542142
installed on tablets which initially served as simple ballistic calculators. They were created not by the Ministry of Defense or a research centre on state commission but by volunteers seeking a quick and inexpensive way to strengthen the Ukrainian army's potential. In subsequent years, when the front line stabilized and the use of heavy calibers was greatly limited, the use of such systems became even more relevant because they were used for high-angle fire by IFVs or tanks. Over time domestic Ukrainian manufacturers of reconnaissance drones emerged; drones bought by pro-defense foundations and the state began to be delivered mainly to Ukrainian artillery units. Alongside that, systems like Kropyva evolved from ordinary ballistic calculators into fire- control systems for artillery batteries and even into tactical-level battlefield management systems. The Ukrainian battlefield management system Delta, which is now being introduced in the AFU as the primary BMS and which will be discussed in Part 4, also appeared in 2015. Like all similar Ukrainian solutions, it was developed by a group of volunteers. Unlike Kropyva or Armor, Delta was designed from the outset as a battlefield management system. In the political conditions of the time the then AFU leadership considered the system too complicated and did not decide to introduce it widely. Nevertheless, it was refined and tested for many years. Gen. Valerii Zaluzhnyi was one of the proponents of implementing Delta in the army and one of the first high-ranking officers to introduce testing of the system during major military exercises. At the same time, in 2014–2022 digital transformation practically did not touch the bureaucratic structures that managed processes in the army and the Ministry of Defense. Tactical- level officers complained about the army's "paperwork." It was joked that the most important piece of equipment for a battalion or brigade commander to guard was not a tank or a gun but the printer — it must always be on hand "in combat readiness." Officers complained about the need to complete an enormous amount of paperwork and keep various records according to regulations dating from the Soviet era, which was often the reason officers left the military or declined promotion. Motivated volunteers who had become officers after the 2014–2015 war left the army because they did not intend to turn into clerks instead of commanding their people on a real battlefield. The process of digital transformation also did not touch the Ukrainian logistics system, where paper documents still prevailed. www.fragoutmag.com