the desired direction through the
introduction of disinformation and
fake news or appropriately targeted
commentary from influence agents.
F
rom the above, it is clear what
we are dealing with, what
methods are being used to carry
out these actions, and what their
objectives are. We are also aware
of the threats generated by
cognitive warfare - the question is:
can anything be done to counter it
and mitigate its effects?
Of course it can, although effective
counteraction requires preventive
measures to be carried out in an
interministerial manner - siloed
approaches must be eliminated in
dealing with a subject that is, by
nature, multidomain and affects all
executive services subordinate to
the Ministry of National Defence,
the Ministry of the Interior and
Administration, the Ministry of
Health, etc.
Counteraction must be very rapid;
in practice, the maximum reaction
time to an adversary's actions must
not exceed five hours, because after
that time their effectiveness drops
sharply. This results from the nature
of social media as an environment of
cognitive warfare, which imposes
a tempo of operations that makes
the classic response cycle of press
units inadequate to the threat. This,
in turn, follows from the need for
very effective Internet monitoring
and coordinated preventive action,
while the current quantitative
strength of the cells responsible for
ANALYSIS
