Frag Out! Magazine

by individual generations of Poles, this is entirely feasible. Nevertheless, the key is to base the message on verifiable data (research) concerning the motivations of the social groups that constitute the personnel pool of institutions essential to the functioning of the country, rather than on the "intuition" of decision- makers. What motivates and is valued by a manager, director, commander, etc. from Generation X may be incomprehensible or even off- putting to people from Generation Alpha when it comes to the Armed Forces. An active, ongoing, high-reach media campaign - mainly on social media - should be launched to counter Russian narrative lines, rather than serving primarily as self-promotion of institutions or as partisan mudslinging aimed at improving polling results. In contrast to Russian messaging, it is recommended that such a campaign emphasize: A. The role of the Armed Forces, as a common good for all Poles, regardless of origin, education, religion, gender, or political views. In general, this speaks to the need for belonging B. Pride in Poland as a country that is good to live in and that must be protected through the fulfillment of one's duties to the Fatherland. Presenting "what we are fighting for" should not rely on patriotic patterns imprinted in schools, because these have only a minimal effect on Gen Z and Alpha due to the cultural changes that have taken place in Poland over the last 25 years. Traditional references to the ethos of uprisings, the Battle of Warsaw, the Warsaw Uprising, etc. obviously have value, but they should probably not be the main point of emphasis, because the goal is to "convince the unconvinced," not citizens who already hold patriotic attitudes. Nevertheless, the message should be developed on the basis of research into the attitudes and motivations of Generation Alpha and Millennials. C. The willingness of NATO countries to fulfill alliance commitments, with concrete examples that will make this credible. This is a very important element because one of the main Russian narrative lines is the alleged ineffectiveness of NATO alliance commitments and the resulting futility of helping the state by reporting for duty in the event of mobilization. Again: this addresses the need for security. D. Clearly showing that the fate of the state in a situation of danger depends on millions of individual decisions and that every citizen's fulfillment of statutory duties toward the state helps defend the country. Again, this is fundamentally about meeting the need for belonging and the need for security. E. Clearly demonstrating how widespread disinformation online is and that Poles fall victim to mass dissemination of fake news that serves a broader purpose - to deprive them of the will to resist and to foster hostility toward helping their own community, namely the state. Specific, well-documented examples should be presented (for example, claims about several hundred flood victims in the Kłodzko Valley). Just as Russian cognitive operations target elites and counter-elites, so too should their prevention involve not only those in power but also the opposition. Opposition politicians must not be excluded from briefings on cognitive warfare and on the actions taken in this area. Only honest information- sharing and the invitation of party leaders — INCLUDING THOSE CURRENTLY IN OPPOSITION — will make it possible to preserve REAL (rather than declarative) continuity of action in the event of a change in government. Such a model already exists in the UK, France, Sweden, Germany, etc. Regular, monthly press briefings, fixed in place and time, should be held for trade media/specialized outlets to explain current issues related to the functioning of individual institutions. This will help build greater trust www.fragoutmag.com

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