Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/693549
military actions in Syria published in February, based allegedly on sources related to Russian armed forces, stated that due to insufficient level of operational readiness there wasn't a per- mission to deploy them to Syria. Predicted, because presence of those modern attack helicopters, capable to night conduct combat missions and effective engaging small and mobile tar- gets, were desired for a long time, even as a compensation for a lack of assault UAVs. At that moment, it is hard to say if it was a planned manipulation or Russian Command changed its mind and decided to take a risk and deploy Mi-28N and Ka- 52 helicopters to Syria. Between 23th and 28th March, four Mi-35M and three Mi-24P attack helicopters left Syria onboard of An-124 Ruslan. They were replaced by Mi-28N and Ka-52 (up to 6th March it was possible to identify presence of two Mi-28N, probably both from the 16th Army Aviation Brigade, and three Ka-52, but it is almost certain that there is more of those helicopters in Syria, most probably four of each type) and at least three Mi-35 in the newest version with integrated ANALYSIS