Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1115818
defense companies. The former have "merely" about 650 RPG-7s and the latter around 480 RPG-7s at their disposal. The overall quantity is then 2,600-2,700 of RPG-7s available to the Polish Armed Forces, which confirms the information of a bit over 2,500 "rg-rur" used so far by our army becoming obsolete. Unfortunately, our domestic manufacturers have not much to offer in this area – despite the two decades of waiting for the RPG-7's service life to end and in spite of the rapid putting of Komars out of service, neither MND's Armaments Inspectorate nor the industry itself have made an effort to work on a long-term program to design a new – disposable or reusable – grenade launcher. It is therefore necessary to purchase a foreign solution and polonize it to a smaller or greater extent. Basically, there are three options to choose from: a) a disposable grenade launcher; b) a "hybrid" grenade launcher, i.e. a reusable aiming mechanism and single-use projectiles with a launcher; c) a reusable grenade launcher or a recoilless gun. Each of the three options (or a combination thereof) has its specific pros and cons. But the Swedish duo composed of the Carl Gustaf M3/M4 and the NLAW seems to be a perfect answer to LF's need to have a real an- ti-tank weapon (standard disposables are certainly not one) at a price several times lower than light ATGMs, and to have a support weapon offering significant striking power and able to enhance anti-tank attacks if necessary. This is not to suggest substituting each RPG-7 with a Carl Gustaf M3 – although the fact that both are operated by a crew of two, which would not necessitate any structural changes, would be an ideal solution for many bull-headed MND officials. It would be reasonable to gain a deeper insight into the experience of Americans, who decided to go for Carl Gustafs as a support weapon for US Army and USMC platoons despite having the Javelin ATGM used at the platoon level and a lot of ATGMs used by their brigades already. What's more, the decision, in spite of the shift in focus on the potential to combat heavy targets, is sus- tained and even developed. Featuring CG M3s at the platoon level in the Polish Armed Forces would require purchasing only about 350 rifles for line units, with 280 additional ones if we take mobilized facility protection and defense battalions/companies into account. With 5% of this quantity earmarked for training purposes and 40% claimed by many to be a per- fect restoration stock, we reach a total of around 960 recoilless rifles (in- cluding the said 40% of reserves, let's emphasize). Of course, estimating the unit cost alone without taking the cost of service and maintenance, spare parts, simulators, profiles, teaching aids, and training into consid- eration leads us nowhere, but the said number of rifles would cost us less than PLN 100 million – excluding the cost of ammo. It would be certainly possible to polonize a part of the range of the dedicated rounds because they are manufactured e.g. in India. There's also ammunition for recoil- less rifles, which is – let's put another emphasis here – cheap. Especially the training type. Making the Carl Gustaf a universal support weapon at the platoon level would also enable our forces to thicken the anti-tank fire in emergency situations given the availability of HEAT ammunition used with the Swedish recoilless rifle. Also – the ULM version would make it possible to have a light guided missile of the range of 1,500-2,000 m at our disposal, but the cost of such a solution is probably considerable. The NLAW, in turn, would make a very good single-use anti-tank weapon. First – it is actually able to combat modern tanks from the front effec- tively. Conventional disposable launchers have nothing to say here, which should be stressed once again. Second – it is a few times cheaper than ATGMs. Making rough estimates, we'd need a maximum of 6 NLAWs per each platoon (regardless of the structure), which gives us a total of 2,100 weapons at the disposal of line units. Mobilized facility protection and defense battalions/companies don't need such a weapon. Taking into ac- count the needs of TDF and SOF, we could easily speak of around 2,500 NLAWs, which translates into over PLN 250 million (again, an amount calculated not exactly as it should be, i.e. based on the "unit cost" alone), and we have to remember that the number of such grenade launchers needs to consider a minimum of two units of fire, training stocks, and restoration reserves. The actual demand of the Polish Armed Forces would include then 10,000 NLAWs, with the cost amounting to around PLN 1.5 billion. Is it a high price to be paid? For making the platoon-level anti-tank de- fense effective again – certainly not. Especially considering that the same number of ATGMs would be several times more expensive, and light "disposables" are not too effective against tanks. The Swedish duo of the Carl Gustaf M3/M4 and the NLAW is a very in- teresting weapon configuration. As an effective and universal support and anti-tank weapon, it should definitely be considered seriously by the Polish Armed Forces. However, the selection of the new military equipment for the lowest level should become a ground for an honest discussion on the structure of platoons and on their tasks and role to be played (in relation to vehicles) and the crew-operated and support weapon they should have at their disposal. Only once all these details are decided on (by testing various alternative structures) will it be possible to work out some reasonable technical-tactical criteria that could pave the way for a tendering procedure for the new weapon. eration leads us nowhere, but the said number of rifles would cost us less than PLN 100 million – excluding the cost of ammo. It would be certainly possible to polonize a part of the range of the dedicated rounds because they are manufactured e.g. in India. There's also ammunition for recoil- less rifles, which is – let's put another emphasis here – cheap. Especially the training type. Making the Carl Gustaf a universal support weapon at the platoon level would also enable our forces to thicken the anti-tank fire in emergency situations given the availability of HEAT ammunition used possible to work out some reasonable technical-tactical criteria that possible to work out some reasonable technical-tactical criteria that could pave the way for a tendering procedure for the new weapon. could pave the way for a tendering procedure for the new weapon. Basically, there are three options to choose from: a) a disposable grenade launcher; b) a "hybrid" grenade launcher, i.e. a reusable aiming mechanism and single-use projectiles with a launcher; c) a reusable grenade launcher or a recoilless gun. Each of the three options (or a combination thereof) has its specific pros and cons. But the Swedish duo composed of the Carl Gustaf M3/M4 and the NLAW seems to be a perfect answer to LF's need to have a real an- ti-tank weapon (standard disposables are certainly not one) at a price several times lower than light ATGMs, and to have a support weapon offering significant striking power and able to enhance anti-tank attacks if necessary. This is not to suggest substituting each RPG-7 with a Carl Gustaf M3 – although the fact that both are operated by a crew of two, which would not necessitate any structural changes, would be an ideal solution for many bull-headed MND officials. It would be reasonable to gain a deeper insight into the experience of Americans, who decided to go for Carl Gustafs as a support weapon for US Army and USMC platoons despite having the Javelin ATGM used at the platoon level and a lot of ATGMs used by their brigades already. What's more, the decision, in spite of the shift in focus on the potential to combat heavy targets, is sus- it a high price to be paid? For making the platoon-level anti-tank de fense effective again – certainly not. Especially considering that the same number of ATGMs would be several times more expensive, and light "disposables" are not too effective against tanks. The Swedish duo of the Carl Gustaf M3/M4 and the NLAW is a very in teresting weapon configuration. As an effective and universal support and anti-tank weapon, it should definitely be considered seriously by the Polish Armed Forces. However, the selection of the new military equipment for the lowest level should become a ground for an honest discussion on the structure of platoons and on their tasks and role to be played (in relation to vehicles) and the crew-operated and support weapon they should have at their disposal. Only once all these details are decided on (by testing various alternative structures) will it be tained and even developed. Featuring CG M3s at the platoon level in the Polish Armed Forces would require purchasing only about 350 rifles for line units, with 280 additional ones if we take mobilized facility protection and defense battalions/companies into account. With 5% of this quantity earmarked for training purposes and 40% claimed by many to be a per- fect restoration stock, we reach a total of around 960 recoilless rifles (in- cluding the said 40% of reserves, let's emphasize). Of course, estimating the unit cost alone without taking the cost of service and maintenance, spare parts, simulators, profiles, teaching aids, and training into consid- eration leads us nowhere, but the said number of rifles would cost us less than PLN 100 million – excluding the cost of ammo. It would be certainly possible to polonize a part of the range of the dedicated rounds because they are manufactured e.g. in India. There's also ammunition for recoil less rifles, which is – let's put another emphasis here – cheap. Especially possible to work out some reasonable technical-tactical criteria that could pave the way for a tendering procedure for the new weapon. www.fragoutmag.com