Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1115818
Contemporary terrorism is a bizarre phenomenon. The less complex it is, the more dangerous it appears to be. At the same time, there are many snap judg- ments, myths, and tales surrounding it. This is largely due to the media popularity of one variant of contemporary terror- ism – Sunni jihadism, which causes the most casualties. We're dealing here with a mechanism similar to that which gov- erns the discussion on firearms, where the notion of "AK-47 as the world's fa- vorite killing machine" promoted by the media makes the debate change into an emotion-fueled argument. In the case of terrorism, this rifle meta- phor is helpful to the extent that it helps us grasp the essence of the idea. If we place a Sturmgewehr, an AKM, and an AR15 next to one another, despite many differences between them we'll be able to notice similarities resulting from the intended purpose of these firearms in terms of their weight, size, and the man- ner of loading. It's the same with terror- ism. Regardless of whether we're dealing with a far-right, far-left, jihadist or other variant of terrorism, all these variants will have certain features in common. Terrorism is a particular form of vio- lence driven by a more or less rational (or sometimes completely irrational) ideology, but functioning – like weapons on the battlefield – in a specific context. This context is composed of social and economic conditions as well as of fac- tors acting as catalysts, especially thirst for revenge for real or imagined wrongs (which may make an attack treated ini- tially as an act of a mentally disturbed person), a sense of relative deprivation compared to other social groups, and a sense of inability to pursue one's rights otherwise. Demographics plays an important part here. Most terrorists are people aged 20-35, usually coming from societies they function and operate in. This is true also in the case of jihadists, where the risk group is made up of second-genera- tion immigrants. As for other ideologies, it is common to see a protest against the preceding generation. Additional elements increasing the rad- icalization are family ties and other in- formal bonds, especially relationships formed in school, in college, in prison, but also online. These relationships produce small autonomous units, called "bunches of guys" in trade-specific jargon, or give birth to so-called "lone wolves" – mean- ing offenders acting alone, giving vent to their emotions and feeding themselves only on propaganda and instructions found on the Internet. These processes play a significant role in the functioning of modern-day organi- zations – or rather terrorist networks, mind you – and in the very tactics of ter- rorist attacks. Intelligence service and the police find it really hard to identify and work out such informal relationships, especially those more casual. This is a point made by leaders and creators of terrorist groups, which can be seen in e.g. the materials distributed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. "Inspire" – the magazine published by the organization – has featured a set of instructions on how to prepare a terrorist attack, head- lined "Open Source Jihad", and in a 2014 interview with an author of terrorism handbooks, hiding under the pseudonym of "al-Qaeda Chef", the interviewed man said explicitly that direct communication with those willing to engage in terrorist attacks led only to them being arrested, and that those who acted alone were harder to detect for Western services. According to the instructions given in the interview, those keen on joining Jihad can announce their ideological affiliation in two ways: they can claim their affiliation during an attack (by e.g. taking hostages to attract attention and buy some time) or by sending a message anonymously after the attack (a safer way). The for- mer is chosen mostly by suicide attack- ers, such as Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people in a nightclub in Orlando in 2016. The very concept of "lone wolves" is, however, not a notion invented by jihad- ists but by the American radical right, whose sympathizers first used the term of leaderless resistance, which can be Many authors writing anything about terrorism start from a discussion about its definition (or the absence thereof) or from statistics. Both these points are as boring as they are vague when we wish to learn anything significant about the phenomenon in question – anything that may help us react to a threat when one occurs. Historical descriptions and hypotheses about the future are not much more helpful either since what is – or may be – happening here and now is most important. Text: MICHAŁ PIEKARSKI Illustration: ŁUKASZ WOOKI KRZYŻANOWSKI ANALYSIS