Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1115818
through a 60-mm plate set at an inclination of 30° – the performance was not that impressive, but what mattered more was the light weight of both guns, especially in the case of the paratrooper version, and their decent direct fire accuracy at a distance of up to 600 m. The ammo in use was quite effective – apart from the rather poorly performing HE shell. What Germans found hard to swallow was that 4/5 of powder charge was wasted when the shell was leaving the de Laval nozzle. In addition, the shells fired left a huge trail of fire and dust behind. The di- lation angle of the danger zone behind the gun was over 60°. The already mentioned anti-tank perfor- mance was not satisfactory either. This is where we should discuss one type of weapon in more detail – the icon of WWII, the Panzerfaust. Although it was a predecessor of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, the way it was operated makes it possible to categorize it as a recoilless weapon be- cause its HE grenade was not rocket-launched (like in the case of the Bazooka or the Panzerschreck) but by means of powder charge in a cardboard tube, which also launched a factory-sealed cardboard cap from the tube-launcher. As a result, at the moment of firing, the supercaliber and disposable Panzer- faust balanced the forces exerted on the launcher's tube and the gunner, acting like a recoilless gun – including the impressive trail of fire behind the launcher and a danger zone of up to 10 m. In pro- duction since 1943, it had been continuously modi- fied. The initial versions (Faustpatrone, Panzerfaust Klein; Panzerfaust 30) were able to get through up to 150 and 200 mm of steel respectively, but offered an effective range of merely 30–40 m. Later ver- sions – Panzerfaust 60 and 100 – could get through as much as 200 mm of steel, and their maximum ranges when firing at immobile/mobile targets were 80/150 m and 60/100 m respectively. The values of their effective ranges were almost two times small- er, though. A characteristic feature of German HEAT charges worth mentioning was the utilization of HE liners made of soft steel sheet, which stemmed from a general lack of resources and a significant short- age of copper. Most importantly, Panzerfausts were mass-produced – by the fall of the Third Reich there were 8.5 million (!) versions of the weapon, and it was exactly this weapon that improved German in- fantry's defenses against tank attacks substantially, especially in the final year of the war, when anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, and tanks alone were scarce in numbers. Panzerfaust's rate of effectiveness was in the range of 3.5 to 7% of the overall damage dealt to Allied anti-tank weaponry – it wasn't high, but af- ter deducting the losses caused by anti-tank guns and tanks, it turned out that even half of tanks de- stroyed by Germans 'fell victim' to Panzerfausts. But Panzerfausts (and Panzerschreck rocket launchers) were used operationally actually only once. As part of an operation known as the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive, the Soviet forces managed to break Finnish defenses and captured the Vyborg on 20 June 1944. The next day marked the initiation of an offensive that was to help Russians make it in- side the operational area and bring Finland to its knees eventually. The operation led to the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, where the last Finnish reserves were trying to patch the crack in the frontline. A notice- able difference was that found in the quality of the Finnish anti-tank measures. By mid-June, Finland's infantry had only 1,854 Panzerschrecks supplied since April 1944 (and 18,000 projectiles). It was very little. Far too little to back up the decreasing number of anti-tank cannons and self-propelled guns. The Finnish had to face the handicap of not being able to effectively fight Soviet tanks supported by artillery – despite the difficult wooded landscape. But on 19 June, German motor torpedo boats supplied the Finnish forces with 9,000 Panzerfausts, and three days later the Luftwaffe provided them with another 5,000 units. The received supplies made it possible to quickly restore the much-weakened anti-tank ca- pability. Combined with determination and effective command, the received weapons helped the Finn- ish to reach a stalemate in the fierce battle at Ta- li-Ihantala. The outcome of the battle coupled with the Allied forces' advances in Normandy translated into Soviets withholding their further attacks on 18 July and engaging in negotiation which resulted in a ceasefire, following up with a truce made on 19 Sep- tember. It was probably the only time in WWII when a given type of weapon (here: Panzerfaust) translated directly into the outcome of a battle and affected the final result of a whole operation. Why is it worth mentioning the above types of re- coilless weapons when describing the Carl Gustaf? Because the Swedish construction engineers had a chance to 'get to know' the seized Soviet and the purchased Nazi recoilless guns. They were also fa- miliar with designs from other countries, including from the US. As a result, the CG is an exceptionally successful combination of some earlier solutions and original Swedish technology. through a 60-mm plate set at an inclination of 30° – the performance was not that impressive, but what mattered more was the light weight of both guns, especially in the case of the paratrooper version, and their decent direct fire accuracy at a distance of up to 600 m. The ammo in use was quite effective – apart from the rather poorly performing HE shell. What Germans found hard to swallow was that 4/5 of powder charge was wasted when the shell was leaving the de Laval nozzle. In addition, the shells fired left a huge trail of fire and dust behind. The di- lation angle of the danger zone behind the gun was over 60°. The already mentioned anti-tank perfor- mance was not satisfactory either. This is where we should discuss one type of weapon in more detail – the icon of WWII, the Panzerfaust. sions – Panzerfaust 60 and 100 – could get through as much as 200 mm of steel, and their maximum ranges when firing at immobile/mobile targets were 80/150 m and 60/100 m respectively. The values of their effective ranges were almost two times small- er, though. A characteristic feature of German HEAT charges worth mentioning was the utilization of HE liners made of soft steel sheet, which stemmed from a general lack of resources and a significant short- age of copper. Most importantly, Panzerfausts were mass-produced – by the fall of the Third Reich there were 8.5 million (!) versions of the weapon, and it was exactly this weapon that improved German in- fantry's defenses against tank attacks substantially, especially in the final year of the war, when anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, and tanks alone were scarce in numbers. Panzerfaust's rate of effectiveness was in the range of 3.5 to 7% of the overall damage dealt to Allied anti-tank weaponry – it wasn't high, but af- ter deducting the losses caused by anti-tank guns and tanks, it turned out that even half of tanks de- stroyed by Germans 'fell victim' to Panzerfausts. But Panzerfausts (and Panzerschreck rocket launchers) Finnish anti-tank measures. By mid-June, Finland's infantry had only 1,854 Panzerschrecks supplied since April 1944 (and 18,000 projectiles). It was very little. Far too little to back up the decreasing number of anti-tank cannons and self-propelled guns. The Finnish had to face the handicap of not being able to effectively fight Soviet tanks supported by artillery – despite the difficult wooded landscape. But on 19 June, German motor torpedo boats supplied the Finnish forces with 9,000 Panzerfausts, and three days later the Luftwaffe provided them with another 5,000 units. The received supplies made it possible to quickly restore the much-weakened anti-tank ca- pability. Combined with determination and effective command, the received weapons helped the Finn- ish to reach a stalemate in the fierce battle at Ta- li-Ihantala. The outcome of the battle coupled with the Allied forces' advances in Normandy translated into Soviets withholding their further attacks on 18 July and engaging in negotiation which resulted in a ceasefire, following up with a truce made on 19 Sep- tember. It was probably the only time in WWII when a given type of weapon (here: Panzerfaust) translated directly into the outcome of a battle and affected the final result of a whole operation. Why is it worth mentioning the above types of re- coilless weapons when describing the Carl Gustaf? Because the Swedish construction engineers had a chance to 'get to know' the seized Soviet and the purchased Nazi recoilless guns. They were also fa- miliar with designs from other countries, including from the US. As a result, the CG is an exceptionally successful combination of some earlier solutions and original Swedish technology. This is where we should discuss one type of weapon in more detail – the icon of WWII, the Panzerfaust. Although it was a predecessor of hand-held anti-tank grenade launchers, the way it was operated makes it possible to categorize it as a recoilless weapon be- cause its HE grenade was not rocket-launched (like in the case of the Bazooka or the Panzerschreck) but by means of powder charge in a cardboard tube, which also launched a factory-sealed cardboard cap from the tube-launcher. As a result, at the moment of firing, the supercaliber and disposable Panzer- faust balanced the forces exerted on the launcher's tube and the gunner, acting like a recoilless gun – including the impressive trail of fire behind the launcher and a danger zone of up to 10 m. In pro- duction since 1943, it had been continuously modi- fied. The initial versions (Faustpatrone, Panzerfaust Klein; Panzerfaust 30) were able to get through up to 150 and 200 mm of steel respectively, but offered an effective range of merely 30–40 m. Later ver- especially in the final year of the war, when anti-tank guns, tank destroyers, and tanks alone were scarce in numbers. Panzerfaust's rate of effectiveness was in the range of 3.5 to 7% of the overall damage dealt to Allied anti-tank weaponry – it wasn't high, but af ter deducting the losses caused by anti-tank guns and tanks, it turned out that even half of tanks de stroyed by Germans 'fell victim' to Panzerfausts. But Panzerfausts (and Panzerschreck rocket launchers) were used operationally actually only once. As part of an operation known as the Vyborg–Petrozavodsk Offensive, the Soviet forces managed to break Finnish defenses and captured the Vyborg on 20 June 1944. The next day marked the initiation of an offensive that was to help Russians make it in- side the operational area and bring Finland to its knees eventually. The operation led to the Battle of Tali-Ihantala, where the last Finnish reserves were trying to patch the crack in the frontline. A notice- able difference was that found in the quality of the LAND FORCES