Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1115818
because vehicles such as the Oplot-T or the T-72B3M feature serial ERAs in turret and hull sides, which basically rules out any effective attacks carried out using a standard anti-tank disposable grenade launcher, whereas the NLAW does not suffer from such impairments at all. The only possible challenger to the Swedish solution can be the completely different, hybrid Panzerfaust-3IT600 with the Dynarange sight, which we will cover in the near future. It's a weapon devised with a totally different approach in mind. The Swedish duo as a solution for Poland? The 1970s marked the beginning of a gradual process of shifting the source of the fire power of mechanized (motorized since the 2000s) pla- toons from soldiers to supporting IFVs/WIFVs. Originally there were a couple of reasons for the change – starting from the necessity to oper- ate on a nuclear battlefield and ending with an increasing presence of modern technology among even the smallest sub-units, with a hope for a significant improvement of the fire power of companies and battalions. The trend escalated rapidly in the recent twenty years, but the causes of changes were different this time. The first cause was a number of West- ern armies shifting from the draft system towards professional armies, combined with a substantial decrease in the armed forces' headcount. This translated naturally into cutting down the number of soldiers serv- ing in many armies at the platoon level, even if their structures remained unchanged in nominal terms. The reduced number of carried soldiers made the 'slimmed down' infantry platoons less and less efficient and ef- fective in carrying out their main operations unaided (i.e. without vehicle support). At the same time, the decreased fire power of dismounted land- ing forces could be compensated for only through an increase in the fire power of vehicles to an extent that the theoretical cumulative fire power of a mechanized platoon would grow instead of falling. Although the said process was partially curbed in some Western armies, its effect in the form of reversed roles in mechanized platoons can be seen in many of them anyway. While in the past armored carriers and IFVs performed an auxiliary role and support dismounted landing forces, nowadays it is the landing forces that support and protect infantry fighting vehicles, whose weapons have become the main source of fire power of mecha- nized platoons. A negative consequence of the above is that soldiers are "tied" to IFVs, which in the case of facing specific landscape conditions (mountains, thick forests, highly devastated urbanized areas) may result in a necessity to choose between operating impaired landing forces or not operating in a given terrain at all. But the main issue is that if an IFV/ WIFV is hit, Western "micro-squads" of platoon infantry lose the ability to operate effectively. The described shift should not be considered in negative terms only if it's actually an effect of a consciously adopted model, like in the case of Germany, where the whole system of solutions could be adopted to the implemented change – from soldiers' individual equipment through vehicle armaments ending with supporting weapons. Meanwhile, the lowest tactical level of the Polish Land Forces, the pla- toon-squad, with three BPW-1s at the forefront, looks like a relic straight from the 1980s. In motorized units using KTO Rosomaks, the only change involves a fourth vehicle in the platoon and a three-person crew of the KTO instead of a two-person crew of the BWP-1. The fourth vehicle is actually utilized as a means of transport for a 60-mm mortar and a 40- mm automatic grenade launcher. The headcount and the composition of a platoon and of motorized and mechanized squads tend to be criticized and said to require changes more and more often. Unfortunately, the Pol- ish Armed Forces – especially the Land Forces – have been ignoring the fective in carrying out their main operations unaided (i.e. without vehicle support). At the same time, the decreased fire power of dismounted land- ing forces could be compensated for only through an increase in the fire power of vehicles to an extent that the theoretical cumulative fire power of a mechanized platoon would grow instead of falling. Although the said process was partially curbed in some Western armies, its effect in the form of reversed roles in mechanized platoons can be seen in many of them anyway. While in the past armored carriers and IFVs performed an auxiliary role and support dismounted landing forces, nowadays it is the landing forces that support and protect infantry fighting vehicles, whose weapons have become the main source of fire power of mecha- nized platoons. A negative consequence of the above is that soldiers are "tied" to IFVs, which in the case of facing specific landscape conditions (mountains, thick forests, highly devastated urbanized areas) may result in a necessity to choose between operating impaired landing forces or not operating in a given terrain at all. But the main issue is that if an IFV/ WIFV is hit, Western "micro-squads" of platoon infantry lose the ability to operate effectively. The described shift should not be considered in negative terms only if it's actually an effect of a consciously adopted model, like in the case of Germany, where the whole system of solutions could be adopted to the implemented change – from soldiers' individual equipment through vehicle armaments ending with supporting weapons. Meanwhile, the lowest tactical level of the Polish Land Forces, the pla- toon-squad, with three BPW-1s at the forefront, looks like a relic straight from the 1980s. In motorized units using KTO Rosomaks, the only change involves a fourth vehicle in the platoon and a three-person crew of the KTO instead of a two-person crew of the BWP-1. The fourth vehicle is actually utilized as a means of transport for a 60-mm mortar and a 40- mm automatic grenade launcher. The headcount and the composition of a platoon and of motorized and mechanized squads tend to be criticized and said to require changes more and more often. Unfortunately, the Pol- ish Armed Forces – especially the Land Forces – have been ignoring the negative terms only if it's actually an effect of a consciously adopted www.fragoutmag.com