Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1173894
the recent years, they still do not have any fighters or attack helicopters. The disproportion of force is very advanta- geous for Russia. Even if one assumes the presence of limited allied units in the region, the war games conducted by RAND in 2016 proved that there is a threat that Russia would manage to take over two capital cities of Baltic countries (Riga and Tallinn) within 60 hours. Of course, there is something more than just the potential of three Baltic repub- lics. This is where the important role of Poland is revealed. Poland might become involved in the country but not due to its natural resources. Poland, due to its localization, is a natural hinterland for armed forces protecting the Baltic countries, e.g. because of its infrastruc- ture, such as airbases and shipyards. The country will be used as a route for the land forces, the roads and railway – for supplies. All of the land communication lines eventually meet at the North-East part of the border with Lithuania, in the so-called "Suwałki Gap". The attempt of closing the gap is then a logical consequence, just like attacks on targets in Poland. The operations might be limited to air raids of offensive aircrafts and to firing of rockets (for example, by using Tornado or Smerch systems). In such a scenario, after im- mobilization of aviation and anti-aircraft defense, both rocket artillery as well as choppers and offensive aircrafts would commence attacks on forces on the move and, at the same time, destroying bridges and viaducts. There could also be some land activity with the goal of taking over the north-eastern territories of Poland, along with opera- tions in other directions (for instance, a landing operation in Western Pomerania in Poland to disrupt the approach of re- serves and a counterattack). It would involve fast activity, maybe even with the goal of taking over the "Suwałki Gap" before the NATO reaches it. One should remember here that Russia pays great attention to the usage of airborne units. It is worthwhile noting that such a sce- nario, in its worse version, assumes that land operations will be relatively limited in terms of the basic goal, which is sep- arating Baltic countries from the rest of NATO and, at the same time, achieving a connection by land between Russia and the Kaliningrad Oblast (assuming that Belarus, for some reason, joins forces with Russia in the conflict). However, the use of precision-guided munition – Iskander (SS-26 Stone) or Kalibr (SS- N-27 Sizzler or SS-N30A) – air strikes or other means seems more probable. Targets might include more than just military or dual-use structures (roads, bridges, railway nodes). It might appear that attacks will be also aimed at other targets, like power plants – in order to force the Polish society and authorities to withdraw from the conflict. A similar role might be served by A2/AD (Anti Access/ Area Denial) systems con- structed by Russia. This "A2/AD umbrel- la" is, assumedly, to prevent the use of the Baltic Sea – including both the sea as well as the air space over sea and ANALYSIS