Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1173894
As one may have noticed, the nature of the forecast war was influenced by the purpose of operations, the environment (including terrain) of operations, and the enemy. Besides, those three basic as- pects include the basic answers to the questions of how future war will look like and what tools and methods of their use are necessary to be victorious. It is easy to spot the difference between a full-scale war in Europe and a local conflict within a different environment (Vietnam, Afghanistan). Here lies the explanation to the problem that needs a separate discussion regarding fights with guerillas and other enemies that conduct irregular operations. The American army would win battles in Vietnam, sometimes even annihilate whole Vietcong units, yet they still lost the war. It resulted from the use of inadequate tools against an enemy that was different from the orig- inally planned one - both Americans in Vietnam as well as Russians in Afghani- stan used forces that were intended for operations in a different type of warfare. They clearly underestimated their ene- mies and utilized ideological rather than realistic assessment of the situation. Very often, one might come across an opinion that we are unable to predict the future, especially when it comes to inter- national politics. Well, the general prob- lem is that instead of focusing on current events the meaning of which we are un- able to assess on an ongoing basis and within a wider context, we should focus on processes of long-term nature. Such processes are visible in Europe. In terms of contemporary and future pol- itics, the situation is relatively foresee- able. We are dealing with an active entity like Russia, the goal of which is to regain its former status of a superpower and its influence – which spread over half of Eu- rope and vast areas of the so-called Third World. It overlaps with the division of Eu- rope into two parts that differ from one another in terms of culture and which has been noticeable for centuries – this, on the other hand, has also an impact on the method of using armed forces. From the geographical perspective, Eu- ropean Theatre of War, is an exception- ally interesting place. Europe is a small continent that lies within the temperate climate zone. It has areas of diverse ter- rain – from high mountains to plains. The coastline is also diversified, and seas sur- round the whole continent except for its eastern part. From the social and economic perspec- tive, Europe is a strongly urbanized continent with large urban centers and often with whole urban areas. Even the less developed countries have industrial potential and various types of infrastruc- ture. That is why, since the industrial revolution, the outcome of wars has been determined by the ability to utilize those factors, which was proved by both world wars in the most spectacular and violent way. What is more, the whole ba- sic organizational structure of modern armies – from formalized doctrines, divi- sion into corps, the method of preparing officers to command tactical units, or even the very definition of general staff that functions in a different form in every European country – is the heritage of the military revolution that took place in the 19th century. So, its characteristics are contrary to areas such as Africa or Latin America, which feature large zones of extreme terrain (deserts, jungles), urban areas are mainly on the coast and around nat- ural resources, dispersed infrastructure and poorly developed industry. Such properties are followed by low num- bers of armed forces, their lower satu- ration with combat equipment. Basically, most of armed conflicts in Africa, Latin America, or Asia in the last fifty years were asymmetrical conflicts, in which regular armed force struggled with gue- rillas or even organized crime groups. Pretty often, there were also civil wars, in which both sides would feature irreg- ular forces. Inevitably, the typical combat vehicle of third world countries is either a surplus (or donated) armored vehicle, a MRAP- class vehicle (being the product of gue- rilla warfare in Africa), or a "technical" pickup truck. Of course, technological progress pro- vides new ways of using power during military operations as well as the possi- bility of supporting them. War in the nine- teenth century took a separate course for land units and naval units. Some- www.fragoutmag.com