Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1173894
times, they would even be subject to two distinct ministries. Such a division even- tually appeared to be absurd, like in the case of Japan during the Pacific War. The invention of planes resulted in creating a new combat environment and the third type of armed forces was established. Over time, new areas of operations were added by rocket weaponry, satellites, re- connaissance and ELINT assets, or cyber warfare. At the same time, there was not only a need for more and more coor- dination concerning those measures but also for combined operations that would use the capabilities of various forces. The impact of those changes on armed forces is evident. Introduction of pre- cision-guided munition was particularly revolutionizing. Aircrafts, ships or land- based missile launchers used various types of guided missiles to destroy mov- ing targets deep within the enemy terri- tory. A century ago, the idea of bombard- ing targets behind the enemy lines was only a subject of experiments. 75 years ago, destroying a factory or a power plant would require dozens or even hun- dreds of heavy bombers. To achieve such a goal 50 years ago, dropping an atom- ic bomb to wipe out an entire city was thought to be the best solution. Today, the same effect can be obtained with several cruise missiles that destroy key elements of the target, which is even easier thanks to the high accuracy of guided munition. It involves something more than just strategic advantage. In the past, infantry could be successful against tanks only at short distances. The gradual evolution of ATGMs has led to the current situation that allows not only very accurate attacks against tanks, but also selection of priority targets, even with an already launched missile, thanks to EO sensors. The meaning of eliminating the C2 vehicles, self-propelled AA artil- lery, or other targets of key importance at a particular moment for the outcome of a battle needs no further explanation. Reaching such a capability requires own- ing, obviously, precise munition and its carriers (launchers), as well as other el- ements of the "chain of destruction". It is necessary to obtain information on the target – not only on detecting it, but also the measurement of characteristic prop- erties (signatures) that allow guiding a missile. It is also of importance to obtain information on the surroundings and pos- sible countermeasures, to have commu- nications system to coordinate the usage of weaponry and, finally, proper training of the personnel operating such systems. The price for that involves high costs – both financial and other (time needed for acquisition of armaments; time needed for training). It leads to a set of consequences for the very course of operating in a convention- al conflict. Development of ISR leads to a problem that, in the document of the Marine Corps Operating Concept. How an Expeditionary Force Operates in 21st Century: "to be detected is to be target- ed is to be killed." It does not, however, stand for automatic shooting at every- thing that is within the range of arma- ments. Using expensive resources – especially missiles that can cost millions of dollars – only when it will have the greatest ad- vantage is a logical strategy. It is then obvious to focus on two categories of targets. The first category is High Value Targets that are of significant value for the enemy. The second category involves High Pay-off Targets the destruction or immobilization of which has a positive impact on the possibility of completing a task with own forces. The ability to quickly detect such targets (especially when they are in motion) and destroy them increases the pace of operations. At the same time, the decision to start a war is becoming more and more difficult due to the growing war expenses, under- stood both as own costs and eventual losses. This purely economic factor is probably the reason why there has been no large-scale inter-state conventional conflict in Europe after 1945 (except for wars within border areas and civil wars). Of course, another explanation is the ex- istence of nuclear weaponry – one must remember that since the 1960s, the nu- clear battlefield is a possibility that both the East and the West have wanted to avoid. At the same time, the possibility of mak- ing up for quality with pure quantity is not that possible anymore. In the Wild West, a gunslinger with a six shooter could be ANALYSIS