Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1193118
In other words, in case when radar-coupled rocket artillery counter-fire is expected, one should expect enemy reaction in up to 5 minutes from the moment when the first of own rounds is fired or, should enemy drones be spotted, enemy reactions shall be expected from the moment when firing positions are assumed. Furthermore, the radius within which Grad, Ura- gan or Smerch salvo lands means that counter-battery maneuver should involve shift of the position by at least 500 m. Considering the above, what is the situation like for the towed 120 mm mortars? Well, it is dire. Rapid engagement and firing position change by 200 m requires 4 to 7 minutes. If the unit is required to shift its position by 500 m, this time goes up by another minute. If the above reaction times seem to be short, one should go back to the Iraq war a decade ago. The Americans, when carrying out counter-battery engagements and with the artillery radars being a part of the MLRS battery C2, have been able to develop firing solutions in up to 2 minutes from the mo- ment when the first projectile was fired. Considering the time that the M26 (Uragan equivalent) rocket spent in the air, the response was very quick – it took 3 to 4 minutes (!). Field fortifications and hiding behind terrain also do not constitute a sufficient solution, since the emergence of new ammunition types. DPICM assets were the first new type of en- gagement means. The abbreviation above refers to cargo munitions with shaped-charge/fragmentation submunition. The shell is only a submu- nitions carrier in this case. After being dispensed over the target area the submunitions neutralize the threat in a greater quantity. Despite the reduced area where the individual submunitions remain effective (10 to 16 sqm, the sum of the effect on target (even when the sum of all of the areas where the effect is present is taken into account) has always been much greater than in case of a single 105 mm or 155 mm artillery round. Submunitions as such have been fusing shaped charge with a pre-frag- mented shell that would be effective against the infantry. Munitions as such are lethal against standing soldiers within areas between 10 to 16 square m. Often, effective radius of 5 to 9 m is also mentioned. Dispensing submunitions as such allows for effective coverage of areas that usually are considered to be blind spots – and these spots are very tempting for the mortar crews - there, the mortar crews have usually been establishing their own firing po- sitions. Soviet and Russian rounds include, currently, 152 mm rounds: 3O23 for 2A65 and Msta-B and 2S19 Msta-S, all containing 40 shaped-charge submunition. The Russians are also using the 122 mm 9K52 Prima rockets. A rocket has been devel- oped for that system, using a composite cargo warhead with 45 shaped- charge/frag submunitions. Meanwhile, Smerch (9M5K5) rockets carry 646 submunitions each (!). Meanwhile, the sensible nature of the idea to place the artillery as- sets under protection of field fortifications is not really valid anymore, as "smart" and "precision-guided" munitions are also becoming far more common. In the West, PGK (Precision Guidance Kit) GPS systems with a lower chance of hitting positions as such. Mortars, meanwhile may fire their rounds at high elevation angles, without any problems. The second method was to place the mortars at strongly fortified and camouflaged locations. Preparing a single mortar position usually required 150 to 300 manhours, and the process was not always possible to be accomplished. The results, however, were quite beneficial. Destroying a battery as such required significant involvement of enemy howitzer squadrons. Furthermore, detecting a properly camouflaged mortar position re- quired aerial reconnaissance right above the firing element, or special recon/sniper/forward artillery observer units to approach the mortar positions at a closer distance. Defining the position of the battery on the basis of effect on target (impact crater shape analysis) has been misleading when it comes to distance, even though the direction could be defined quite accurately. As a result of the above using maneuver to defend oneself was a rarity. In case of the 120 mm mortars, deployment time was placed between 90 and 120 sec. To leave the firing position, a well-trained platoon-sized unit would need from 210 to 300 sec, in- cluding shift of the position by 200 m. Furthermore, this had to include preparation and development of a more accurate firing solution over the course of engagement. Adjusted fire was possible at rate of 8 to 10 rpm. Currently the battlefield is changing rapidly, especially when it comes to the counter-battery engagements. This renders any remedial mea- sures other than dynamic maneuver virtually unusable. First, the reaction time has gone down. The Russians have been using automated artillery fire control systems since the Cold War. Systems as such have been used since the 1970s. Mashina and Mashina-M allowed the Soviet units to as- sume firing positions and open fire in up to 5 minutes. These systems were then replaced by Kapustnik/Kapustnik-B/BM with digital communi- cations and Glonass/INS navigation. These shortened the reaction time even further, down to a minute, without prior positioning required. 1K123 Viviary is becoming a standard in the artillery brigades. The systems mentioned here, despite their less advanced technologies, are virtually on par with the new generations of the NATO systems. As a result of the above, the time to response is not really far off when compared to the NATO standards. 15 years ago, in case of the old 1V12-3 "Mashina-M" the response time was defined as 60 to 120 sec for a mortar battery and up to 240 sec for an artillery squadron. Currently, there is a tendency to shorten the "Kapustnik-B/BM" reaction time, with simultaneous broad employment of UAVs in a role of target detection and firing solution ad- justment assets. The systems listed above, coupled with counter-fire ra- dars, make it possible to lay down counter-battery fire, mainly with the use of missiles and rockets. Time required to reach the target for the giv- en projectile needs to be taken into the account as well. For the 122 mm Grad/Prima/Tornado-U/G rocket it is defined as 20 sec for 10 km and 80 sec for 20 km. Uragan 220 mm rockets reach targets at distances of 20 km in 40 sec. The same rockets can reach targets 35 km away in 2 min- utes. 300 mm 9A52 Smerch is the most serious element of the Russian counter-battery fire arsenal. The rockets in question can carry DPICM and guided warheads. These projectiles reach targets at the distance of 30 km in 40 sec, and to reach threats located 70 km away, they need 140 sec. Due to the mighty submunitions and 207 m CEP at 90 km (in case of the 9A52 system), the element should shift its firing position after the engagement by more than 500 m. www.fragoutmag.com