Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1258433
gradual improvement of IFV protection could also be witnessed. This is because special care became necessary, to minimize the losses. Protection of the IFVs became even easier, as they carried fewer and fewer troops. Limiting the number of troops also made the vehicle lighter - 1 less soldier translated into weight loss of 4-6 tonnes which made it possible to make the vehicle more compact, lighter, and to improve the armor. This, on the other hand, made it easier to decide on decreasing the number of troops carried and resigning from the amphibious capacity - which, in turn, increased the protection levels even more. Although some Western armies partially decided to hamper the process, role reversal within the mechanized platoons occurred. Even though IFV/ APCs used to have an auxiliary role in the past, supporting the troops, currently the troops around support and cover the vehicles, the armament of which became the main source of firepower of mechanized platoons. The negative consequence here is seen in tying the soldiers to the IFV. In some, specific conditions (mountains, forests, urbanized areas) this could result in a necessity of choosing between using the infantry (weak) alone, or not getting involved in operations in the given area at all. One should also remember though, that the fight involves an entire system, not its elements. This is why the IFVs are usually selected based on the local context, including elements such as the infantry platoon structure, availability of anti-tank and support weapons at the company/battalion level, tactics, funds available or involvement in conflicts. This is also why the aforesaid change cannot be interpreted solely as a negative one, especially when it a result of a consciously adopted model (like in the Bundeswehr for instance), as the „whole" system evolved, from the level of soldiers individual equipment, through vehicle armament, ANALYSIS