Frag Out! Magazine

Frag Out! Magazine #31

Frag Out! Magazine

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it comes to effectors and sensors. The use of ballistic missiles or cruise missiles for that purpose is far more probable (or even - UCAVs could be employed here). These could be launched from mobile, scattered launchers, against targets in the Persian Gulf - military ones and related to the crude oil industry; in Israel, or even against the US bases in Europe. It needs to be assumed, however, that launching activities in the theater, the allies would also deploy the missile defense assets in the region (MIM-104 Patriot and THAAD), as well as assets that would complement the ones already available in the area (two THAAD batteries operated by the UAE, or the Israeli Arrow system). The analysis also needs to take into account the potential offered by the US Navy's ballistic missile defense capabilities (cruisers and destroyers). Furthermore, the sensors available on the battlefield, of the AWACS, U-2, and F-35s, should also be accounted for - and this has been demonstrated recently, during several military exercises. The potential consequences and the level of complication related to defending the infrastructure listed above have been well exemplified by the events of September 2019. Back then, two oil refineries became a target for the UAVs and cruise missiles. Systems based outside the Middle East may be the final piece of the puzzle. Should an attempt be made to destroy targets in Europe, the European Phased Adaptive Approach component could be used - warships and Aegis Ashore systems in Romania (active) and Poland (still under construction). The detection and destruction of missiles already launched is not where the defensive capacity ends. It would be logical that mobile launchers would be on the move immediately after launch, to load another missile, and launch it. Even though for technical reasons, looking for a launcher before use could be troublesome, the situation changes immediately, after the missiles are launched. Then, the launcher can be detected and destroyed rapidly. Especially with relevant forces being available (such as CAPs in the region). Cutting off the Hormuz Strait is another viable possibility here. Looking at the map, the task seems simple enough. It is a narrow bottleneck. Iran can easily access it from the mainland and the Islands (Abu Musa, Siri). Iran also has numerous assets at its disposal such as land-based anti-ship missile systems, missile boats, submarines, and naval mines. In particular, the Iranian Navy has numerous missile boats at its disposal - 22 of them (Italian Combattante II class). The Revolutionary Guards have 70 missile and torpedo boats at their disposal, of varied classes. The submarine fleet includes 15 miniaturized submarines and three Kilo-class vessels. Hypothetically, Iran could create a naval A2AD bubble of its own, denying access to this strategically important body of water. The problem stems from the quality of the defensive force creating that bubble. Iran has only six frigates at its disposal. Three of those frigates were built in the early 1970s. Considering their age, the capabilities that they have within the scope of air defense remain quite limited. Even if one of the S-300 batteries, and other air defense systems, potentially the most effective ones, are redeployed, the allied coalition gaining air superiority in the area is just a matter of time. Then, an intense air operation could begin. The objectives would include the neutralization of both the light warships, as well as the coastal missile batteries. Following that step, it would be possible to execute mine countermeasure operations to clear the sea routes. Ultimately, even though the submarine fleet seems to be quite significant quantitatively, as it is dominated by the miniaturized subs of limited combat capabilities and autonomous capacity, detection and neutralization of those vessels is just a matter of time. The Kilo-class vessels may pose the only challenge. Before the conflict, these could enter the Arabic Sea and try to attack the US Navy assets. There, they would be met by a welcome party of US submarines, surface combatants, and naval aviation assets. Even in conditions as such one could assume that three Kilos www.fragoutmag.com

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