Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1308154
ingly effective. Soviet 3M6 Shmel and 3M14 Malyutka ATGMs were deadly. Along with the RPG-7, the aforesaid weapons were responsible for two-thirds of the Israeli losses during the first three days of the conflict. Only after the tactics were changed, with some changes happening at the frontline as well, it became plausible to diminish the effectiveness of the anti-tank weapons over the following days. 25% of the vehicles, however, were incapacitated with the use of ATGMs and RPGs. Losses among the tank crews were serious and unacceptable as well. 60% of the MBTs hit had their armor penetrated. 30% of those caught fire and 25% of the crews (surviving ones) were se- riously wounded in fires. Since the Israeli population was small, especially when it comes to the citizens the age of whom allowed for conscription, and due to the limited IDF reserves, Israel could not afford losses so serious. Furthermore, it turned out that even though 60% of the vehicles lost could have been recovered and overhauled, and even though new allied MBTs could be delivered during the conflict (the case of M60s), the loss of life was irre- coverable. This pertained both to the duration of the conflict, as well as the period directly after the conflict. As a result, protecting the crews became the key. Furthermore, Israel had no access to the special armor technology. Neither the British nor the Americans did share the know-how on this type of protection. Even though these have become available in the mid-1970s in the United States of America and West Germany (as the Merkava design process was half-way complete), the complete lack of protection as such in Israel, until the mid-1980s, is proof that no transfer of know-how occurred, within that regard. This made it challenging to achieve a proper level of protection. The first studies concerning that matter began in 1970. Soon afterward, two technology demonstrators were presented, using the Centurion chassis as the base. The testing of the first four prototypes began in 1974. Serial man- ufacturing of Merkava Mk 1 was launched in April 1979. The first battalion, with 30 MBTs, gained operational readiness in 1980. MERKAVA MK. 1 - PROTECTION UNVEILED The Merkava Mk. 1 design is quite unusual when compared to the post-war MBTs. The engine has been placed in the front. What was the reason for that? The lack of access to modern armor technology forced the designers to use straight plates made out of rolled steel, and a myriad of cast steel elements. However, these could not create a proper level of protection for the crew, reaching beyond the safety levels associated with MBT designs such as M60 or Chieftain. Tal's vision and Tilan's engineering skills shone here. The protection levels required were to be achieved with the use of two methods here. First - the diminished size of the turret, especially when it comes to its frontal surface. Secondly, its side plates were set at a maximum angle (in relation to the front of the vehicle), inclined to the back. A similar high-angle approach was adopted with regards to the upper-front plate of the hull. The second set of measures adopted have seen the engine, drivetrain, fuel tank, air filtering system, suspension, batteries, and other components being used to shield the crew compartment. A concept was adopted, with an awareness that the vehicle could lose its mobility in combat and have a lower level of survivability overall, for the sake of maximizing the level of crew protection. Primitive, yet effective layered spaced armor arrangement has been created, consisting of a thicker front plate, followed by the tank components (engine, fuel tanks), and a thinner plate separating the MBT's components from the crew compartment. Containers and compartments of all sorts were used for that purpose as well. A solution as such turned out to be surprisingly effective, with the main armor surfaces being meticulously designed (with VEHICLES