Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1365706
launchers in a limited quantity - only two battalions of a single land forces' brigade operate these platforms. Latvia, meanwhile, decided to get second-hand CVR(T) vehicles from the UK. As the Baltic states are also procuring self-propelled artillery assets, or NASAMS air defense systems (Lithuania), it may be said that the defensive potential is boosted. There is no chance, however, to push away the potential aggressor. Given the difference in potential, when compared to Russia, the role the Armed Forces of the Baltic states play is very much different too. In case of a war, they would need to create resistance strong enough to give the allies time to respond. Even though light infantry would not survive hours, with the survivors being forced to engage in irregular warfare, any procurement of IFVs or ATGMs extends the time that the defenders may have, pushing the aggressor away. It is natural that support provided by the allies would be the main response here. Operational activities that are undertaken during peacetime act as a deterrent, in a multidimensional manner. First, deployment of forward-present forces on the NATO eastern flank, even though relatively weak (a couple of multinational battalions) increases the probability of the allies reacting, keeping solidarity among them. An attack against Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia is interpreted differently from an attack against British, Canadian, Polish, Italian, or German troops stationed there - from the point of view of international relations, and the point of view of the law. Secondly, NATO forces should, by definition, be able to respond quickly. The VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) element stays in high readiness and should be ready to deploy to the conflict region in less than a week. Then it should provide support to the attacked state and wait for reinforcements to arrive - in 30-45 days. The above tool is complemented by the 4x30 initiative: 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air force squadrons, and 30 warships, that are ready to deploy in up to 30 days. Both response forces, as well as the 4x30 forces, should be activated at the moment when the tensions grow. They should be ready at the moment when the crisis breaks out at the latest. Strategic surprise is difficult to create. It requires the circumstances to be aligned with the situational needs. So it happened in 1941 when the Red Army suffered because the intelligence provided by the intel services was disregarded by the decision-makers. The Arab nations also managed to surprise Israel in 1973. Here we could not have spoken about a complete surprise. The initial success was dictated by the political circumstances. Israel did not decide to carry out a preemptive strike. And step as such could change the results of the war in the end. Scenario as such should be seen as highly plausible. This translates into political, propaganda, ANALYSIS