Frag Out! Magazine
Issue link: https://fragout.uberflip.com/i/1365706
and intelligence activities, and other actions below the threshold of an open conflict, that introduce confusion thus delaying the reaction of NATO as a whole. States such as Poland may put their faith in the allied forces forward-deployed to its territory, and, to some extent, to the partial deployment of the VJTF at the last second. It may also be worse - with only the forces sent to respond to the crisis only by some states being involved. Only after the conflict breaks out, we may be certain that all of the aforesaid quick reaction forces and mobilized units of the member states would participate - provided that they can deploy. This entails consequences. First, one could modernize their own forces - this is the trend that is visible in the Baltic states. Nonetheless, their capacity remains limited. Armed Forces of Poland, Finland, Sweden, with air forces, MBTs, and warships, could inflict greater damage onto the aggressor, making the aggression challenging, to say the least. Considering the current modernization plans adopted by the states in the Baltic Sea Region (Finland: acquisition of MRCA, procurement of corvettes; Sweden: procurement of Gripen NG and Patriot systems; Poland: procurement of the F-35 and previous acquisition of two coastal missile squadrons - with Estonia making a similar move), the Baltic defense system could have a great set of capabilities at its disposal in the future. It is not hard to imagine that military cooperation, within NATO, and within the EU as well, could create a tangible benefit. The fact that Finland or Sweden are not a part of NATO shall not be viewed as an obstacle. From the formal/treaty standpoint, reciprocal support may result on the grounds of the Lisbon Treaty that includes a provision stating that the EU states falling a victim of aggression should be supported. The provision in question has already been put into practical use once, following the terrorist attacks in France, back in 2015. One could hypothetically create a scenario in which, in near future, an Estonian missile battery could, together with the Finnish corvettes, push away the threat posed by the Russian fleet in the Baltic Sea, making use of data provided by Polish MRCA, with the extra cover being provided by the Swedish or Lithuanian air defense systems. A scenario as such, even though seemingly coming out of a political fiction novel, would mean that a conflict as such would still be classified as a local one. One should take into account the fact that thanks to the post- Soviet resources, as well as the modernization efforts of recent years, Russia has a serious arsenal at its disposal, when compared to its neighbors. The Russian Air Force operates 342 MRCA belonging to the Flanker family - including 98 of the latest Su-35 jets. One should also take 125 Su-34 Fullbacks into account, acting in a strike role. For the sake of comparison - Finland currently operates 62 Hornets, and it is looking to replace them with 64 new aircraft. Sweden is planning to operate 60 JAS39E Gripens. Poland, following the F-35 procurement, will have 80 IV and V generation MRCA at its disposal. The aforesaid shared potential would mean that the allies will have 200 MRCA at their disposal. With peacetime availability of 80%, the above translates into 160 combat-ready airframes, burdened with many missions - defensive and offensive ones, CAS, and recce. Obviously, even in an event of a full- scale conflict, Russia will not be able to deploy all of its potential. This is because it would still need to protect the strategic ports in the north and the far eastern frontier. Nonetheless, the combat readiness of the European states will also never be at 100%. Furthermore, losses should be accounted for - including aircraft shot down, and ones that need to undergo maintenance, thus being unable to participate in the activities, at least for some time. The very same factors would impact Russia. Still, the resources and mobility at disposal of the Russian military are advantageous. Furthermore, the Russian may entrust the ground-based IADS, or attack helicopters with some of www.fragoutmag.com